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During the twentieth century, virtually all western democracies saw
growing media concentration as a threat to freedom of the press and to
democracy. Most have adopted laws to support press diversity, whether
through competition (antitrust and media specific) laws or subsidy
arrangements, often subsidies targeted specifically to support weaker
competing media.' Historically, it has been the same in the United States.
A famous journalist and press critic, A.J. Liebling, long ago quipped:
"freedom of the press belongs to those who own one."2 Liebling's quip
makes ownership central. And that has beeh the general view. Although
very cautious about government intervention,3 the single most important,
semi-official study of the mass media in U.S. history, the Hutchins
Commission Report of 1947, 4 saw the problem of concentration-the
"decreased proportion of the people who can express their opinions and
ideas through the press"--as one of three factors threatening freedom of
the press.5 They accepted the reality that modem economic forces drive
inexorably toward media concentration.' Even then, most American cities
1. See PETER J. HUMPHREYS, MASS MEDIAAND MEDIA POLICY IN WESTERNEUROPE 66-110

(1996).
2. A.J. LIEBLING, THE WAYWARD PRESSMAN 265 (1947). In slightly different
words---"freedom of the press is guaranteed only to those who own one"--the same remark is
quoted from later sources. E.g., A.J. LIEBLING, THE PRESS 32 (2d rev. ed., 1975).
3. See THE COMMISSION ON FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, A FREE AND RESPONSIBLE PRESS: A
GENERAL REPORT ON MASS COMMUNICATION:

NEWSPAPERS,

RADIO,

MOTION PICTURES,

MAGAZINES, AND BOOKS 5, 83-86 (1947).

4. See id.
5. Id.at I; see also id. at 17, 37-44. Although clearly focused on dangers of media
concentration, Chafee was very skeptical of use of law to restrict it. See ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR.,
2 GOVERNmENT AND MASS COMMUNICATIONS, A REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION ON FREEDOM OF
THE PRESS 537-677 (1947). For example, though favoring "a very sparing use ofthe Antitrust Laws
against communications industries," id. at 674, Chafee emphasized the little the antitrust laws could
do, id. at 653, 676-77, and the dangers in their use, id. at 666-74.
6. Cf CHAFEE, supra note 5, at 617 ("It is obvious, then, that bigness in the press is here to
stay, whether we like it or not.").
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were coming to face daily newspaper monopolies, a trend that has since
increased, leaving only a handful of American cities with separately
owned and operated daily papers.7 One way to understand the
Commission's central recommendations concerning the need for a
"socially responsible press" is that it tried to make the best of a bad
situation.
The media is a huge non-democratically organized force that has major
power over politics, public discourse, and culture. As such, it is not a
surprise that media concentration receives great attention. Just as in
Europe, where pressure for governmental responses came mostly from
Left and Centrist political parties, trade unions, journalists' associations,
and consumer groups,' many Americans, especially on the left and center,
but many conservatives as well, see media concentration as a problem and
dispersed ownership as crucial for democracy.9 Legal policy long reflected
that view. Nevertheless, the last twenty years have seen a remarkable
change in the legal treatment of media concentration. This Article aims to
describe and evaluate that change.
This recent change has had three fronts. Most overtly, there has been
a dramatic reduction in legal restrictions on ownership concentration,
especially related to broadcast and cable media and to media crossownership. Second, there has been a change, often unarticulated, in the
view of appropriate criteria or standards with which to identify
objectionable concentration. Something resembling antitrust standards
7. In 1910, with much smaller populations, 689 American cities or towns had competing
(i.e., separately owned and operated) daily newspapers. C. EDwIN BAKER, ADVERTISING AND A
DEMOCRATIC PRESS 16, 146 n.34 (1994). In 1940, shortly before the Hutchins Commission's
Report, the number had fallen to 181. Id. By 2002, the number was 14. Walt Brasch, The Media
Monolith: Synergizing.America,COUNTERPUNCH, athttp://www.counterpunch.orglbrachmedia.html
(Feb. 9, 2002). In addition, another twelve cities had Joint Operating Agreements (JOA), that is
cities with two or more papers that are required to be editorially independent but are operated
jointly as one business. Facts About Newspapers 2001, available at
http:llwww.naa.org/info/factsO1 130jointop/index.html.
8. See HUMPHREYS, supra note 1, at 94.
9. The literature is filled with both popular and scholarly discussions. Robert McChesney
is possibly the bestknown leftist currently emphasizing the concern. See, e.g., EDWARD S. HERMAN
& ROBERT W. MCCHESNEY, THE GLOBAL MEDIA: THE NEW MISSIONARIES OF CORPORATE
CAPITALISM (1997). More centrist is BENH. BAGDIKIAN, THE MEDIA MONOPOLIES (6th ed. 2000).
A partial dissent might describe the central problem as involving market forces generally as the
main determinant of the media content, not the specifics of ownership. See, e.g., ROBERT BRITT
HORWITZ, COMMUNICATIONANDDEMOCRATICREFORMIN SOUTHAFRICA (2001). Objection to the
distorting effects of market-based commercialism was, for example, the basis of European
commitment to public broadcasting. Most European courts find a public monopoly over
broadcasting to be consistent with broadcasting freedom and some countries view the existence and
adequate support of public broadcasting, at least in some contexts, to be constitutionally required.
ERicBARENDT,BROADCASTINGLAW: ACOMPARATIVE STUDY 57-59,69-70,74 (1993). Obviously,
the same critic can object to both concentrated ownership or market forces.
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that look solely at market power to raise prices above competitive levels
has replaced previously invoked democratic concerns. Finally, within
constitutional doctrine, especially in the lower courts, there has been an
unarticulated change from viewing the press as consisting of
instrumentally-valued entities that are protected for how they serve
people's need for a robust communication order to viewing media entities
as being rights-bearing units in their own right. This changed conception
changes in turn the view of media structural regulation from being an often
appropriate means to serve First Amendment interests in a free and diverse
communications order to being a presumptive interference with corporate
entities' First Amendment rights.
Parts I (related to constitutional doctrine) and II (related to legal
regulation) of this Article will critically describe these shifts, including the
underlying assumptions that support them. These Parts provide the
empirical basis for the Article title. My evaluative claim is that the legal
order is giving up on democracy in two profoundly troubling ways. First,
policy makers, especially in the FCC, have been abandoning their earlier
concerns with how media ownership can be structured to further a
democratic society and are now apparently concerned only with making
the media more responsive to demands for commodities. Second, judicial
doctrine evidences a declining willingness to accept legislative structural
policies in the media area, in a sense going back to a Lochner-era,
unreflective notion of existing property distributions as a natural baseline.
This change essentially replaces democracy, which has authority to make
structural policy to further people's values, with the market as a measure
of value. Both in administrative realms and implicitly in lower court
constitutional decisions, there has been a fundamental shift away from the
notion that the government aim should be to promote a democratic
communications order. The new attitude is that the only goal of regulation
should be to assure efficient production of commodified media products
within competitive markets.
My criticism of the shift would be inapt if ownership concentration is
not a problem. Thus, Part III describes but then rejects arguments that the
concern with ownership and undue concentration is either misguided or,
at least, vastly overstated. Unless those arguments are rightly rejected,
antitrust law as currently practiced may embody the only needed limits on
ownership. Finally, Part IV catalogues some more specific objections to
mass media concentration and suggests elements of more desirable
policies. Both Parts III and IV assert that the special democratic and
cultural role of the media, as well as specific features of the market for
media goods, explain why even a desirable recasting of antitrust law to
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include consideration of "non-economic" factors"° would be insufficient
for optimal media ownership regulation. Thus, these Parts argue for
special media-related ownership policies.
I. CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
Legal regulation of concentration consists in two parallel but
intersecting stories: the legal regime adopted by Congress or state
legislative bodies and expanded by administrative agencies, and the
constitutional standards that this regime must meet. Change could occur
in either the regime favored by policy makers or the constitutional
standards formulated by the courts. In fact, change has occurred in both
dimensions. Although, as will become clear, holding the two separate is
somewhat artificial, 1 here I will consider the situation as it appears
constitutionally and then in Part II look at development within the actual
legal regime.
The First Amendment might have at least four possible relations to
media concentration. Arranged in order of increasing opposition to
concentrated media, the First Amendment might: (i) require government
to limit concentration, (ii) prohibit government from affirmatively
promoting concentration, (iii) leave government relatively free to choose
structural media policies in general or at least in respect to concentration,
in
or, finally, (iv) seriously limit government's authority to engage
12
structural regulation including its power to restrict concentration.
My claim here will be that the Supreme Court holdings have been most
consistent with the third possibility-leaving the government relatively
free to engage in structural regulation. However, with encouragement by
the Supreme Court's recent articulation of a new doctrinal approach and
with a new, usually unarticulated conception of media claimants' status,
lower courts have increasingly adopted the fourth-constitutional limits
on legislative power over structure.
American constitutional jurisprudence generally shies away from
finding affirmative obligations, the first possibility. Mostly it only

10. Maurice E. Stucke & Allen P. Grunes, Antitrust and the Marketplace of Ideas, 69
ANTITRUsT L.J. 249 (2001).

11. An illustration might be the invalidation by lower courts as unconstitutional a statutory
ban on cross ownership of telephone company and cable system in their local operating area, and
the dismissal of an appeal of this holding as moot due to congressional action that on policy
grounds eliminated the challenged restrictions. United States v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co.,
516 U.S. 415 (1996) (vacating lowerrulings afterpassage ofthe Telecommunications Act of 1996).
12. Analytically, there is also the possibility that the First Amendment requires the

government to promote concentration. I leave that out-no one whom I know has advanced such
a position even as a possibility.
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identifies constitutional prohibitions. 3 Thus, unsurprisingly, the
Constitution has never been authoritatively interpreted to require limits on
concentration.
Closely related is the issue of whether the Constitution affirmatively
requires the government to regulate on behalf of expressive interests of
nonowners or the needs of the public. So far the answer has been no.14 In
the most prominent case, a political party and a public interest group each
asked the court to require (or to order the FCC to require) a television
network to air their paid editorial advertisements.15 The plaintiffs claimed,
first, that government involvement in broadcast licensing and in
prohibiting non-licensed broadcasting were among the factors that created
state action." Second, they argued that this state action created a
constitutional duty to require that broadcasters present communications by
outsiders, especially for those outsiders willing to pay to have their
message presented. 7 With only Justices Brennan and Marshall dissenting
on these points, the majority rejected one or the other of these claims. 8
However, should the answer always be the same? In broadcasting, the
government self-consciously promoted competitive media outlets. Maybe
it should be required to provide access or other opportunities for the public
if,for example, it creates, or there otherwise is in fact, a communications
monopoly? Should some degree of common carriage be constitutionally
required, if the government creates a local telephone or cable monopoly?
In one case where the government granted monopoly control to a single
cable company, a claim was made that the Constitution required the
government to condition the grant on some duty to allow some public
access in the use of the medium. Without a court ruling on this or the
plaintiffs' other claims, the case settled in favor of the plaintiffs. 9

13. Obviously, this claim is too simple. The one claim can be turned into the other-the
government can be prohibited from not taking some action, which happens in an equal protection

case whenever the court invalidates an exclusion of a group from the category of beneficiaries.
14. This situation can be contrasted with common requirements, of both constitutional and
statutory basis, for access in many situations in Europe-although only a speaker's right to reply
to false, or negative statements about the speaker is a common requirement at the constitutional
level. See BARENDT, supra note 9, at 144-67.
15. CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
16. Id. at 172-81.

17. Id. at 182-92.
18. See generally id. In addition to Justices Brennan and Marshall, several other Justices
thought it was clear thaf the claim would be valid if there was state action but these Justices found
no state action. More recently, however, the Court seems to be unanimous that the existence of state
action, namely, state ownership, of a broadcast station normally creates no type of forum and, thus,
creates no obligation to present expression of outsiders. Arkansas Educ. Tel. Comm. v. Forbes, 523
U.S. 666 (1998).
19. Missouri Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. Kansas City, 723 F. Supp. 1347, 1350, 1353
(W.D. Mo. 1989) (refusing to dismiss this or other more traditional claims made by the plaintiffs).
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The second possibility is that the First Amendment restricts the
government's power to purposefully promote media concentration." The
claim could be that such a pro-concentration policy restricts the First
Amendment rights of those who do not then own a media outlet or who are
not granted the monopoly. In contrast, the government can assert authority
to conclude that sometimes a monopoly or a more concentrated ownership
regime would lead to more efficient use of resources-and a better overall
communications order. For some portions of the communications order,
such government authority historically has been assumed-for example,
in relation to telephone operating companies-even though current
government policy wholeheartedly takes the opposite policy position of
trying to promote competition.
The government's theoretical premise is that it should be able to
engage in structural regulation to improve the quality of the
communications realm, and under some circumstances concentration could
have this effect. Thus, a lower court once upheld FCC authority to deny
a license to an available slot in the broadcast spectrum space if the agency
concluded that the additional broadcast licensee would undermine the
economic viability or quality of broadcast service provided in a given
geographical area."- The reasoning was that the geographic area covered
by the license might not provide adequate (advertising) revenue to support
quality broadcasting by the larger number of stations.' A license grant
would result in "ruinous competition." 3 Although the FCC eventually
dropped the policy behind this case, the "Carroll doctrine," courts never
rejected the policy as impermissible on constitutional grounds.24
More recently, potential competitors challenged government grants of
cable franchise monopolies. The government never clearly articulated its
policy rationale for granting an exclusive license. A possible explanation
is that a monopoly provider, using a single cable wire, would require less
I should disclose that I suggested including this claim in the complaint.
20. European cases presenting the claim that a public broadcasting monopoly was
unconstitutional might be seen to raise a similar claim. The context is different, though, since
national public broadcasting systems in Europe were typically required, often constitutionally, to
provide for diversity-a policy designed to accomplish at least arguably the key goal of a rule
requiring the prevention of monopolies. In any event, with the exception of Italy, where the
Constitutional Court found that a public broadcasting monopoly was impermissible at least at the
local level, the European courts routinely rejected these claims. BARENDT, supranote 9, at 56-58.
21. Carroll Broad. Co. v. FCC, 258 F.2d 440 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
22. Id. at 443.
23. Policies Regarding Detrimental Effects of Proposed New Broad. Station on Existing
Stations, 3 F.C.C.R. 638, 640 (1988).
24. Id. at 638 (eliminating the Carroll doctrine). Since the doctrine authorized restraint of
speech-on broadcast licenses--on grounds obviously unrelated to physical scarcity, it is
interesting that the doctrine was noted, specifically without either approval or disapproval, by the
Supreme Court in Red Lion Broadcastingv. FCC,395 U.S. 367, 401 n.28 (1969).
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economic (and physical) resources to provide a given geographical area
with cable service. Additional cable franchisees may not offer
substantially different communication content but would require large
expenditures on "duplicative" facilities for which someone, ultimately the
residential users, would have to pay-again, a form of the "ruinous" or
wasteful competition argument. The monopoly grant might increase
people's communicative opportunities if the government combined the
monopoly grant with regulations that direct (some) potential monopoly
profits be spent on various communication-oriented public benefits-for
example, public access, educational, or governmental (PEG) channels and
maybe facilities and personnel to support these channels, or an obligation
to provide cable service to the entire community (even unprofitable
areas).2" In addition, the government could try to control monopoly profits
through rate regulation-a structural policy significantly limiting the cable
operator's freedom.26 Essentially the policy goal would be to avoid waste
of resources and to direct that savings go to providing broader or better
communications content or less costly service. If achievable, these
benefits, which the market (whether or not competitive) would not
provide, suggest a media specific justification for a monopoly franchise,
at least in some circumstances.
A Supreme Court decision, Los Angeles v. PreferredCommunications
Inc.,27 is widely interpreted as finding such monopoly franchises to be
unconstitutional. This interpretation, however, probably over-reads the
decision. The Court issued an emphatically narrow decision.28 In rejecting
the suit's dismissal, the Court postponed deciding whether there would be
a First Amendment violation if the City "refus[ed] to issue a franchise to
more than one cable television company when there was sufficient excess
physical and economic capacity to accommodate more than one." 9
Although subsequent discussion focused mostly on physical capacity, the
Court's formulation obviously leaves open to interpretation the issue of
"sufficient excess ... economic capacity."3 Is there sufficient capacity
whenever more than one cable system could survive in a competitive
market? Or, alternatively, is there sufficient economic capacity only when
25. Under the economic conditions hypothesized here, there would be insufficient revenue
to get good results from imposing these costly requirements on multiple competing systems.
26. This power has been upheld against constitutional attack. See, e.g., Time Warner Entm't
Co. v. FCC, 56 F.3d 151 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
27. 476 U.S. 488 (1986).
28. See id. at 493.
29. Id. at 492 (emphasis added). The Court remanded in order to provide an opportunity to
develop a factual record. Id. at 496. Lower courts then held the monopoly franchise to be
unconstitutional, at least in Los Angeles. Preferred Communications v. Los Angeles, 13 F.3d 1327
(9th Cir. 1994).
30. PreferredCommunications, 476 U.S. at 492.
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an additional system would not undermine provision ofthe level or quality
of service that the City desired and would deliver it at the lowest possible
cost to the members of the public? These matters have not been resolved.
The choice between third and fourth possibilities-leaving the
government generally free to engage in structural regulation or limiting
such authority-has dominated recent debates. It is here that recent lower
court cases have evidenced a shift, made without justification or selfconscious explanation.
Restricting this government power to limit concentration should seem
implausible. Such a reading could, for example, protect corporate attempts
to amass monopolistic or otherwise vast communications empires, a result
that could undermine a diverse, pluralist marketplace of ideas. Thus,
corporate media's attempts to establish constitutional limits on this
government power have consistently lost in the Supreme Court.
The issue first clearly came before the Court in 1945.31 The Associated
Press, an association of newspapers, argued that the First Amendment
exempted them from government antitrust regulation.32 The Supreme
Court forcibly rejected the assertion.33 Justice Black wrote for the Court:
"Surely a command that the government itself shall not impede the free
flow of ideas does not afford non-governmental combinations a refuge if
they impose restraints upon that constitutionally guaranteed freedom ....
Freedom of the press from governmental interference . . .does not
sanction repression of that freedom by private interests. 34 The
government was allowed to intervene structurally to promote freedom!
Although the issue was slightly different, earlier in 1943, a broadcast
network challenged rules designed to prevent the broadcast network's
contractual control of affiliate local stations-in effect an anticoncentration measure in that the rules were designed to limit concentrated
network power and to protect independent decisionmaking authority of
local broadcasters.35 The Court unanimously rejected the industry's First
Amendment claim,36 and it has never since backed away from this
position. For example, in rejecting corporate First Amendment claims, the
Court in 1978 unanimously upheld limitations on a newspaper owning
broadcast stations in the locale in which the newspaper company
operated.37 In an earlier 1956 case, although not raising the constitutional
issue, the Court upheld very restrictive national limits on the number of

31. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
32. Id. at 19.
33. Id. at 20.

34. Id.
35. NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943).
36. Id. at 226-27.

37. See FCC v. Nat'l Citizens Comm. for Broad., 436 U.S. 775 (1978).
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broadcast stations a single entity could directly or indirectly control.38 As
will be discussed further below, these cases represent a history in which
the Supreme Court always upholds congressional structural regulation of
the media, that is, regulation not tied to or aimed at suppressing particular
media content against assertions that the regulations violate the First
Amendment rights of corporate owners.39 In the context of constitutional
attacks on structural regulation, the only regulation questioned by the
Court was, as noted above, when the legislative authority-a city
government-was creating, not restricting, concentration in the cable
industry.40 There the Court required the city to show a good reason for its
action.41
The Supreme Court has been clear. Recent decisions by the lower
courts, however, show that they have not gotten that message. Lower
courts have increasingly found structural regulation of communications
industries to unconstitutionally interfere with media entities' asserted First
Amendment rights. Without a complete review, two lower court cases
illustrate this point in relation to ownership. (As will be noted, these cases
may be prescient.) The increasingly activist, conservative, pro-market
Court may abandon its earlier approach as described here. Despite
continuing to uphold structural mediaregulations, its recent decisions have
been cast in scrutiny language suggesting the possibility of invalidating
regulations on First Amendment grounds if corporate lawyers can
convince the Court that the structural choices are inadequately
justified-an approach that may encourage abuse by lower courts.42
Early in the development of cable, Congress and the FCC had
concluded that telephone companies should not own cable systems in the
geographic area of their joint operation.43 Phone companies were later
allowed to offer "carriage" of cable programming over their phone
lines-but the programming provider/seller had to be independent of the
phone company. 4 This ownership regulation could serve various purposes.

38. See United States v. Storer Broad. Co., 351 U.S. 192, 203-04 (1956) (upholding a limit
of seven stations per service category).
39. See C. Edwin Baker, TurnerBroadcasting: Content-BasedRegulation of Persons and
Presses, 1994 Sup. Cr. REv. 57.
40. City of Los Angeles v. Preferred Communications, Inc., 476 U.S. 488 (1986).
41. Id. at 494-96. Although not related to control of concentration, the case, sometimes cited
for limiting government's power to engage in structural regulation, Miami HeraldPublishingCo.
v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974), has been interpreted by the Court to have struck down the right
to reply law because it (improperly) penalized specific content, that is, was a content rather than
a structural regulation. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 653-55 (1994); see Baker,
supranote 39, at 57-58.
42. See infranotes 66-85 and accompanying text.
43. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. v. United States, 42 F.3d 181, 185 (4th Cir. 1994).
44. Id.
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Use of the phone company "wires" by video suppliers other than the phone
company could potentially produce competition for a local cable company.
As a common carrier, the phone company would not be permitted to
discriminate among potential video services wishing to deliver
programming. Phone company carriage creates the possibility of multiple
competitors who could avoid the huge cost of laying their own lines. In
contrast, if the phone company itself were the cable operator, that is, if it
sold the video programming to the public, the phone company might
inappropriately cross subsidize its cable service with revenue from its
regulated phone service, thereby competing unfairly.45 Worse, it was
feared that the phone company could and would discriminate in favor of
its own programming over that of other entities who might otherwise
deliver programming over the phone lines.46 Although formal regulation
could prohibit both of these objectionable practices,47 the complex
accounting and behavioral practices involved makes effective enforcement
awfully difficult, resulting in the "hands-on" regulatory solution becoming
more theoretical than real. This regulatory difficulty, however, is largely
eliminated by the separation created by the cross ownership rule. The rule
simply tells the phone company that, as long as it is a phone company (a
common carrier), it cannot also be a different type of company-a cable
company that sells video content to the public. The corporate entity has to
choose which business to be in. Nevertheless, two circuits found that this
argument bordered on the irrational; they held that the ownership bar
violated the telephone companies' First Amendment rights.48
This conclusion represents a radical repudiation of the past. The
premise, seemingly implicit in all past Supreme Court decisions on the
subject, had been that regulation of corporate entities in an effort to
promote a better communications order raised no serious First Amendment
issues. The government could not censor speakers but could regulate to
open up the structure. Phone companies existed to serve people's
communications needs and were subject to any form of regulation that
served those needs. Individuals, not corporate enterprises, were the
fundamental constitutional rights holders and any rights that media
enterprises hold were derivative. These recent cross-ownership cases
45. L at 190.
46. Id. at 190 n.13.
47. Even the constitutionality of such regulations is unclear. Some lower court decisions
suggest that phone companies may have a First Amendment right to discriminate against (i.e.
exclude) some users on the basis of the content of their speech. See, e.g., Carlin Communications
v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 827 F.2d 1291, 1294 (9th Cir. 1987); Carlin Communications
v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel Co., 802 F.2d 1352, 1360-62 (1 th Cir. 1986).
48. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. v. United States, 42 F.3d 181, 202 (4th Cir. 1994),
vacated, 516 U.S. 415 (1996); U.S. West., Inc. v. United States, 48 F.3d 1092, 1094 (9th Cir. 1994),
vacated, 516 U.S. 1155 (1996).
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implicitly reject that view. Instead, they recognize a type of rights of
corporate entities entirely absent, at least until recently,49 in any Supreme
Court decision. Whether these holdings are authoritative is unclear.
Congress adopted legislation that, in the name of deregulation, eliminated
this restriction on the telephone companies. The Supreme Court then
vacated the Court of Appeals' decisions without indicating any view on
the merits, remanding to determine mootness5
Second is a case involving ownership of cable systems." At the
direction of Congress, the FCC adopted a rule permitting a single multiplecable operator (MSO) to own cable systems that serve no more than thirty
percent of the country's subscribers to multichannel video program
distributor services (primarily subscribers to cable and direct broadcast
satellite). 2 A comparison might help put this rule in context. The country
has about 12,600 radio stations and about 10,400 cable systems. The
Supreme Court upheld an FCC rule (since abandoned) restricting a single
entity from owning more than seven FM and seven AM radio stations.5 3
Even if every owner owned the maximum, the country would have at least
900 radio station owners and each owner would be able to reach only a
small portion of the American public. The FCC's new cable rule allowed
a single entity to own cable systems that serve thirty percent of the
country's subscribers. Assuming roughly equal sized systems and little
overlap, a single entity could own about 3,467 cable systems. Under this
rule, the country could be left with only four separate cable owners.
Four owners is a lot more concentrated than the mandate of at least
nine hundred approved by the Supreme Court but it turned out that
mandating at least four is too restrictive of corporate ownership "rights."
The Court of Appeals in Times Warner EntertainmentCo. v. FCC4 took
the constitutional challenge to this rule very seriously. It observed that the
rule "interferes with [the cable owners'] speech rights by restricting the
number of viewers to whom they can speak." 5 The court then avoided the
constitutional issue by finding that, on the record before it, the "[thirty

49. See infra notes 66-85 and accompanying text.
50. United States v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., 516 U.S. 415 (1996); United States v.
U.S. West, Inc., 516 U.S. 1155 (1996).
51. United States v. Storer Broad., 351 U.S. 192 (1956).
52. Id. at 193.
53. Id. at 195 n.1 (citing 47 U.S.C. § 3.636 (1953)).
54. 240 F.3d 1126 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
55. Id. at 1129. The court is not quite right. The rule leaves the cable company as free as
anyone else in the country to try to place programming on others' systems. What the cable operator
wanted was to have speech rights that, on the court's reasoning, Congress could only guarantee to
one other speaker (one other corporation) in the country---the opportunity to use its own
monopolized facilities to speak to people.
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percent] horizontal limit is in excess of [the FCC's] statutory authority."56
The court commented that it could understand reasoning that "would
justify a horizontal limit of [sixty percent].""7 It recognized Congressional
authority to prevent concentration to a degree that would allow a single
company to control the survival of any particular programmer. 8 Thus,
Congress could guarantee at least two owners but the court indicated
serious constitutional doubts about a rule that assured at least four. 9
A second holding in Time Warner, although not directly concerned
with concentration, illustrates this developing approach to structural
regulation. At the direction of Congress, the FCC prohibited a cable
operator from using over forty percent of its first seventy-five channels for
programming owned by the cable operator or its affiliates.60 By
guaranteeing opportunities for unaffiliated programming, this requirement
partially responds to potential anti-competitive effects of vertical
integration-the combination of delivery and programming. The rule
assures that audiences will receive programming created by more
independent voices. In Time Warner, the court held the FCC had not met
First Amendment requirements in justifying this rule.6 1 The First
Amendment problem is that the rule restricts cable companies' "editorial
' and, the court
control over a portion of the content they transmit" 62
concludes, this "burden[s] substantially more speechthan necessary. 63 On
similar grounds, another court found that a local regulation that required
local cable operators to provide carriage facilities to competing broadband
Internet Service Providers violated the cable operators' First Amendment
rights."
These decisions seem directly contrary to prior suggestions by the
Supreme Court. The Court inthe TurnerBroadcastingSystem, Inc. v. FCC
cases upheld "must-carry" requirements, essentially the same type of
intrusion into cable company's authority as involved in these cases. 65 Of
course, the Court was closely divided in the Turnercases-but the divisive
issue was whether the must-carry rules should be considered contentbased. In the subsequent Comcast Cablevision v. Broward County and
Time Warner lower court cases, there is less reason to view the rules as

56.
57.
58.
59.

Id.at 1136.
Id at 1132.
Id at 1131.
Id. at 1134-35.

60. 47 U.S.C. § 533(f)(1)(B) (1993).
61. Time Warner, 240 F.3d at 1139.
62. Id. at 1129.
63. Id. at 1139.
64. See Comcast Cablevision v. Broward County, 124 F. Supp. 2d 685 (S.D. Fla. 2000).
65. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 217 (1997) (Turner fl); Turner Broad.
Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 622 (1994) (Turner1).
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content-based. 6 Rather, by merely requiring that the cable operator carry
unidentified independent programming, the rules operated much like a
common carrier requirement. But even in the major dissent in Turner 1,
Justice O'Connor suggested that the government could impose on cable
operators, in an analogy with telephone companies, a common carriage
duty in respect to at least some of their channels 67 -precisely the
requirement that the lower court in Time Warner struck down. Curiously,
despite heavy reliance on Turner I, the court in Time Warner made no
reference either to O'Connor's approval of precisely this type ofrestriction
or to the majority's actual holding in Turner I that the government could
require the cable company to carry (specific) channels unaffiliated with the
cable operator. 8
After a consistent sixty year history of Supreme Court acceptance of
structural media regulation, these lower court decisions striking down
ownership limits (i.e., the cross-ownership rule limiting telephone
companies ownership of local cable systems and the rule limiting
concentration in the cable industry) and striking down requirements that
cable companies carry others' programming over their facilities, should
come as a surprise. I suggest that conceptually, these decisions represent
two significant changes.
First, these cases explicitly apply a scrutiny analysis that, in the
structural media arena goes back only to Turner L69 Thus, the court in
Time Warner repeatedly cited Turner I & II for the scrutiny test and how
to apply it, not for the Turnercases' holdings, which involved virtually the
same issue-requiring the cable system to carry outside channels-as in
Time Warner.70 Imposition of this justificatory burden on the government

66. See Comeast, 124 F. Supp. 2d 685 (S.D. Fla. 2000); Time Warner, 240 F.3d at 1126..
67. Turner 1, 512 U.S. at 684 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
68. See Time Warner, 240 F.3d at 1126.
69. The great foundational media cases-such as Miami Herald and Red Lion-made no
mention of scrutiny. After toying with the issue in PreferredCommunications,the Court in Turner
Iemphasized using scrutiny tests, purportedly to evaluate the constitutionality ofmediaregulations.
See Turner1,512 U.S. at 641-42. The majority continually invoked the idea of scrutiny, mentioning
it on fifteen separate pages of its opinion. See id. The issue of scrutiny has plagued the Court since.
In Denver Area Education Telecommunication Consortium v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727 (1996), in an
opinion discussing different scrutiny analyses but refusing to settle on one, the Court properly
struck down portions of a law requiring the suppression of, or giving cable systems authority to
suppress, indecency. Id. at 743. Despite the government's plausible claim that the law was merely
a structural regulation of cable, to the extent the decision invalidated the statute, it should be
applauded for identifying as a constitutional evil the statute's aim of suppressing particular content.
Clearer scrutiny analysis, however, would not have aided but only further confused the Court's
reasoning.
70. See Time Warner, 240 F.3d at 1126 (citing the Turnercases over a dozen times, almost
all dealing with how to apply scrutiny, but interestingly all in the first part of the decision dealing
with ownership). It did not bother with the Turner cases explicitly (presumably because it had
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was new in Turner 17-and careful thought should be given as to whether
it is justified.72 Historically, the Court, in approving structural regulations,
merely looked to see if it could identify ajustification for the law in terms
of improving the communications order and, finding one, approved the
law. For example, there was no attempt to see whether cross-ownership
rules or a limit of seven on the number of television stations that an entity
could own was closely tailored or did not regulate more speech than
necessary to serve some government interest.73 Essentially, unlike the prior
approach, the scrutiny analysis creates room for any activist court to
manipulate its characterization of the government interests to find them
inadequately served and, thus, strike down any structuring provision of
which it does not approve.
In contrast to the earlier approach, not only will this scrutiny test allow
invalidating legitimate structural regulations, it is not evident that the test
would identify laws that, historically, the Court has struck down. In Miami
HeraldPublishingCo. v. Tornillo,74 the one significant case where the
Court did strike down a media law that is sometimes seen as structural, the
Court did not consider how closely the right of reply law served the state
interest or how important or compelling the state interest was-although
the fit seemed close and the interest important. 7 Rather, whether because
it invaded editorial control (a common interpretation now implicitly
repudiated by the Court in Turner I case) or because it penalized the
paper's initial speech (the interpretation emphasized in Turner 1) Miami
Heraldinvolved the Court directly finding an abridgement of protected
speech and, without more, holding it unconstitutional.76 This approach
followed the practice of many great First Amendment cases protecting
speech-such as in Brandenburgv. Ohio,77 New York Times v. Sullivan,78
and Hustler Magazine v. Falwell.79 In each of these cases, and in Miami
already established how to apply the test) in the portion of the opinion dealing with the issue that
was virtually identical to Turner's--theuse of channel capacity by outsiders. As to this issue, the
result in Time Warnerwas the opposite of that reached in the Turner cases and the opposite of that
approved in dicta by Justice O'Connor's dissent. See generallyid.
71. In most respects, Justices Steven's opinion in Turner Irepresents the more traditional
deference to congressional structural regulation.
72. Although agreeing with the result, I have previously criticized both the scrutiny analysis
and the content-discrimination analysis of the Court in the Turnercases. See Baker, supranote 39.
73. See United States v. Storer Broad. Co., 351 U.S. 192 (1956). Cf. FCC v. Nat'l Citizens

Comm. for Broad., 436 U.S. 775 (1978).
74. 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
75. See generallyid In many European countries, for example, the interest has constitutional
status. See supra note 14.
76. Miami Herald,418 U.S. at 258.
77. 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
78. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
79. 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
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Herald, the results would likely change under the scrutiny analysis. In
each, the government interest involved could be considered very important
and it is unclear that any other means would serve the interest as well. The
Court, however, neither balanced nor applied a scrutiny analysis. Rather
it determined that the law restricted speech that the Court could explain
must be protected by the First Amendment-and that point concluded the
reasoning. 0 In other words, application of scrutiny analysis is probably
less protective of speech than the Court has been in its great speechprotecting cases and, at the same time, allows an activist court to
invalidate laws involving the distribution and promotion of speech
opportunities that the Court has traditionally approved.
Second, and possibly more important, these cases represent a subtle
and undefended reconceptualization of the First Amendment. The courts
are basically offering a new (and unwarranted) vision of the status of
media entities. Earlier cases treated media entities instrumentally in terms
of serving a democratic society's need for non-governmentally created or
approved information and vision. Regulations striking at the heart of the
media's function were invalid. Hence, censorship-penalties on particular
speech choices, which now provides the favored interpretation of Miami
Herald -and rules that undermine the institutional integrity of the press82
interfere with this instrumental role. These should be unconstitutional on
that basis. When protected, media entities were protected in order to serve
the interests of the audience in the receipt of uncensored and diverse
content.8 " However, unlike individuals for whom the notion of structural
regulation is somewhat incoherent and whose autonomy the Court often
protected, the Court never treated structural regulation of the press, absent
reason to see the law as undermining the press' contributions to the
audience, as creating any particular constitutional problem.
Now, however, possibly egged on by the Turner cases, these lower
court decisions are treating media enterprises as rights bearers in their own
behalf. On the older view, a court would not ask whether limiting the
number of media outlets one firm could own or requiring cable systems to
offer channel capacity to outsider programmers would "burden

80. See C. Edwin Baker, Harm, Liberty and Free Speech, 70 S.CAL. L. REv. 979 (1997).
81. Although the Court initially offered two, apparently different, justifications for its
decision in MiamiHerald,the Court has since limited the rationale of Miami Heraldtothe concern
with content-based censorship. See, e.g., Turner , 512 U.S. 622, 644, 653-55 (1994).
82. This problem was the basis of the asserted right not to disclose confidential sources that
four, and depending on how Justice Powell is counted, maybe five Justices accepted in Branzburg
v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 707-08 (1972).
83. This is the respect in which the Court's statement in Red Lion---"[i]t is the right of the
viewers and listeners ... which is paramount"--has general applicability. Red Lion Broad. Co. v.
FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969). That also is why the court immediately supported this claim with
a proposition drawn from print media cases.
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substantially more speech than necessary." The court would not treat these
rules as burdening speech. Rather, the rules distribute speech
opportunities. The question is whether they do so in a manner that
plausibly promotes, or at least could not be thought to undermine, the
functioning of the communications order. A "yes" answer was generally
easy. That is, the Court never conceived the corporate media as subjects
whose moral autonomy must be respected." The Court accepted as a
matter of course any structural regulation that could be reasonably seen to
serve a better, more robust democracy. It saw absolutely no serious First
Amendment interest that was in opposition to structural regulation
designed to assure a better-a more diverse, more participatory, less
concentrated-media order. But in the (brave) new world now being
offered, the corporate media are the central rights-bearing subjects.
Interference with these huge, often monopolistic, institutions is now seen
as a First Amendment offense. Justice Black's admonition in Associated
Pressv. UnitedStates has been forgotten."
II. CONCENTRATION POLICY

The primary concerns here are to survey existing media specific
concentration policies, see how concentration policy has evolved over
time, and examine the intellectual underpinnings ofthe changes. However,
media specific ownership policy operates within an overlay of general
laws, specifically antitrust laws. 6 For example, FCC rules have long
rigidly restricted concentrated ownership of broadcast properties, making
antitrust concerns largely irrelevant. Recent deregulatory moves, however,
resulted in proposed mergers of local radio stations being accepted by the
FCC but opposed by the antitrust division of the Justice Department as
anti-competitive.8 7 A central policy issue is whether essentially exclusive

84. This lack of moral autonomy explains why must-carry rules as well as other structural

regulations do not run afoul of basic First Amendment protections of the individual as were
involved in the flag salute case. West Virginia State Bd. ofEduc. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943);
see also Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977) (holding one cannot be forced to display on
license plate a motto to which the driver objects).

85. See supratext accompanying note 34.
86. For an overview, 5ee H. Peter Nesvold, Note, CommunicationBreakdown: Developing
an AntitrustModelfor MultimediaMergers andAcquisitions, 6 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA
&ENT. L.J. 781 (1996).
87. Elizabeth A. Rathbun, Justice Tells ARS to Sell Stations, 126 BROADCAST & CABLE 45,
10 (1996). In agreeing to the Westinghouse purchase of Infinity Broadcasting, the justice
department required the sale of stations that would have allowed Westinghouse's share of the radio
advertising market in Philadelphia to rise from 28% to 45% and in Boston from 15% to 40%,
indicating that sometimes a 40% share is too much. Ira Teinowitz & Michael Wilke, Justice
DepartmentSets 40% as Guide on Radio Mergers: Solutions Tied to TargetAudience Paves Way
for Westinghouse Dealfor Infinity, ADVERTISING AGE, Nov. 18, 1996, at 65.
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reliance should be placed on antitrust law. Therefore, this Part will begin
with a brief review of antitrust issues related to media ownership and then
conclude with an assessment of whether antitrust law even potentially
offers an adequate approach to the ownership issue.
A. Antitrust Law and the Media
The presently dominant approach to mergers-the concern most
overtly of section 7 of the Clayton Act 88-seems to be a Chicago School
interpretation that focuses almost exclusively on economic, primarily
efficiency, concerns. As explained by the Justice Department's merger
guidelines, antitrust law's merger restrictions have as a dominant, arguably
exclusive, aim "that mergers should not be permitted to create or enhance
market power or to facilitate its exercise" in order to prevent "a transfer of
wealth from buyers to sellers or a misallocation of resources."89 The
merger guidelines are logically defined and calibrated to identify a merger
in any market in which the merger would cause an increase in the merged
finm's power over prices. Their application, however, is hardly
mechanical. Despite a theoretical economic logic, the tasks of defining the
product and the geographical markets are not exact sciences. In the media
context, for example, the FCC has maintained for the last twenty years that
all information and entertainment media are part of the same product
market, implicitly treating them as substitutable.9" The main rival view is
that each media form is a separate product category, as the courts have
usually held in respect to newspapers,91 and the Department of Justice has
concluded in respect to radio broadcasting.92
Undoubtedly, antitrust enforcement that successfully furthers economic
efficiency will, in some haphazard way, serve non-economic aims as well.
The key issue here, however, is whether non-efficiency concerns do or
should affect the underlying antitrust analysis. Antitrust history, for
example, suggests "democratic" or political concerns with concentrated
88. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1988). Section 7 prohibits mergers "where in any line of commerce...
in any section of the country, the effect of such acquisition may be to substantially lessen
competition or tend to create a monopoly." Id. Also relevant are the Sherman Act, which refers to
an "unfair method of competition," 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988), and Section 5 of the FTC Act, which
applies to an "unfair method of competition," 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1988).
89. U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE & THE FEDERAL TRADE COMM'N, HORIZONTAL MERGER
GUIDELINES 0.1 (1992, rev. 1997), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/
horizbook/hmgl.html.
90. See Nesvold, supranote 86, at 823 n.262, 856 n.452.
91. Id. at 823-29; see also United States v. Times Mirror Co., 274 F. Supp. 606, 617 (C.D.
Cal. 1967).
92. See, e.g., United States v. CBS, 63 Fed. Reg. 18,036 (Dep't of Justice Apr. 13, 1998);
Sarah Elizabeth Leeper, The Game ofRadiopoly: An Antitrust PerspectiveofConsolidationin the
Radio Industry, 52 FED. COMM. L.J. 473, 482-83 (2000).
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power.93 A strong case can be made that non-economic media-specific
considerations, such as democratically-based concerns relating to diversity
in the marketplace of ideas or to the capacity of small numbers of firms to
dominate the formation of public opinion, are appropriately considered. 94
Some recent antitrust scholarship argues that the primary or, at least, a
prominent policy concern in the media arena should be power within the
so called marketplace of ideas. 95
The identification of goals makes a huge difference. A marketplace of
ideas focus could lead antitrust analyses to different formulations of both
the relevant product markets and the level at which concentration becomes
problematic. For this focus, the relevant market is people with a
subjectively defined set of interests. An interest in diversion from a
person's workday world would encompass all potentially diverting media.
An interest in in-depth local news might include only daily newspapers
local to the audience. An interest in in-depth leftist perspectives on local
events would not find conservative papers to be within the market and
would find monopoly power in the absence of competing leftist papers (or,
maybe, competing leftist media). Christian activists need both media
favoring right-to-life issues and media favoring liberation theology-and
maybe competition within each framework. Blacks certainly need media
promoting both assimilationist and Black power views-and maybe
competing versions of each. From this audience perspective, the market is
monopolized if these "activist ideas" are not offered in competing media
using a format on which a person relies.
The theoretical point is that the dominant antitrust focus onpower over
pricing can be distinguished from power over the content availablefor
consumer choice. In the currently dominant paradigm, a merger that
dramatically reduced the number of independent suppliers of a particular
category of content-say, news or local news or Black activist
news-creates no antitrust problem if, as likely, it does not lead to power
to raise prices.9 6 However, if the concern is power to negatively affect

93. See, e.g., RUDOLPHJ.R.PERITZ, COMPETITIONPOLICYINAMERICA:HISTORY, RHETORIC,
LAW (2000).
94. See Robert Pitofsky, The PoliticalContentofAntitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1051 (1979);
Stucke & Grunes, supranote 10.
95. See Stucke & Grunes, supra note 10.
96. It is possible, but unlikely, that an audience category would be both sufficiently defined
and sufficiently valued by advertisers that one media firm serving them would have power over
advertising rates (or in the case of print media, also power over prices to consumers) such that the
content category would be aproper product category for traditional antitrust purposes. More likely,
an antitrust regulator could conclude, for example, that although only one radio station in a
community offers content desired by this group, potential competition exists from other stations
in the area. Low entry barriers for these stations means that the single station should be unable to
exercise improper market power over price. This potential competition does little, however, to
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consumers' choices, power over content should have a policy status at
least equal to power over price."
Existing antitrust law may not be entirely immune from these noneconomic, media-specific concerns. At least one recent antitrust case
probably requires such a perspective. The Newspaper Preservation Act
(NPA),98 a congressionally created exception to the antitrust laws, allows
two (or more) newspapers to form a joint operating agreement (JOA)
under circumstances of economic distress at all but one of the papers. A
JOA combines the papers' business sides (giving the joint entity greater,
possibly monopoly, pricing power) as long as the editorial sides are
maintained as entirely independent. A common complaint about this
arrangement is that the combination can often exercise even greater market
power than could a single paper after the other failed. Weeklies or
suburban papers, for example, make this complaint. They argue that they
would be better able to compete economically against a single surviving
paper than against the stronger force of the JOA juggernaut. Dissolving a
JOA, which predictably results in only one paper surviving, should
increase economic competition but not competition within a marketplace
of ideas. Thus, when a court recently held that an agreement to dissolve
the JOA violated the antitrust laws, its decision made perfect sense from
the latter perspective but not from the traditional economic focus.99
Horizontal mergers, the implicit subject of the above discussion, are
complemented by non-horizontal mergers, a category sometimes
subdivided between vertical and conglomerate. 00 Vertical mergers were
once widely condemned by both academics and courts as generally
unnecessary and anti-competitive. Since the 1960s, however, Chicago
School commentators have argued that this type ofmerger seldom (if ever)

provide actual competition in any marketplace of ideas or to provide this narrow audience choices
relevant to their interests.
97. This point is effectively elaborated and applied to media industries in Neil W. Averitt &
Robert H. Lande, Consumer Sovereignty: A UnifiedTheory ofAntitrust and Consumer Protection
Law, 65 ANTTRUST L.J. 713, 715, 752-53 (1997).
98. Pub. L. No. 91-353, § 2,84 Stat. 466 (1970) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1804 (2000)).
99. Hawaii v. Gannett Pac. Corp., 99 F. Supp. 2d 1241, 1249-50 (D. Haw.), aff'd 203 F.3d
832 (9th Cir. 1999). But see Reilly v. Hearst Corp., 107 F. Supp. 2d 1192, 1210-12 (N.D. Cal.
2000) (rejecting similar argument). See also Stucke & Grunes, supra note 10, at 270-74.
100. In some respects "conglomerate" mergers may be more like horizontal than vertical
mergers. HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS
PRACTICE 388 (2d ed. 1999).
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harms consumers and almost always produces important efficiencies."'
Antitrust enforcement has become rare.10 2
United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc. 3 illustrates both prior
attitudes and current trends. Though involving a vertical price fixing
conspiracy, not a vertical merger, the same reasoning should apply since
in both contexts the concern is impermissible market power of the
integrated entity. In ParamountPictures,the price fixing involved vertical
arrangements between the entities that produce and distribute and those
that exhibit first run movie theatre releases. 0 4 The Supreme Court
affirmed an order requiring the producer/distributor defendants to divest
some of their ownershipinterests in theatres.'0 5 It also directed the district
court to evaluate the legitimacy of other instances of such ownership."0 6
The subsequent consent judgment required additional divestiture of the
defendant producer/distributors' ownership interests and severely
restricted their future ownership of theatres.' ° This framework prevailed
in the industry for forty years. Then in 1989, the court of appeals found
"changing circumstances" and lifted the portion of the consent decree that
would limit Warner Brothers' ownership of theatres!08 Although this
finding was possibly well taken, the decision probably also represents the
generally less skeptical, modem acceptance of vertical integration.
Still, some life remains in never completely repudiated objections to
vertical integration. In the media area, opposition to vertical mergers
seems overtly responsive to marketplace of ideas concerns. During the
1990s, for example, the FTC opposed aspects of QVC Network's (owned
in part by a major cable programmer and a major cable system operator)
proposed acquisition of Paramount Pictures (a major programmer).0 9 The
vertically integrated firm would both produce programming and distribute
it to consumers. The FTC's objection was that its predictable bias in favor
of its "own" programming could cause a decline in the quality and output
101. ELEANOR M. Fox & LAWRENCE A. SULLIVAN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON ANTITRUST
839-41 (1989); HOVENKAMP, supra note 100, at 377 n.1 (citing articles by Richard Posner and
Frank Easterbrook for the proposition that vertical mergers should generally be permitted, and by
Robert Bork that they should always be legal); id at 381 (noting a dramatic shift toward allowing
vertical integration since the 1960s).
102. HOVENKAMP, supra note 100, at 386 (prevailing judicial approach to condemn only in
extreme circumstances); id at 389-90 (suggesting that Justice Department's Merger Guidelines
reflect little attempt to police vertical mergers); Fox & SULLIVAN, supra note 101, at 840 (noting
there has been little enforcement since mid-1960).
103. 334 U.S. 131 (1948).
104. Id. at 140-41.
105. Id. at 149.
106. Id at 151-53.
107. United States v. Paramont Pictures, 85 F. Supp. 881 (S.D.N.Y. 1949).
108. United States v. Loew's, Inc., 882 F.2d 29, 33 (2d Cir. 1989).

109. ABA SECTIONOF ANTITRUSTLAW,

ANTITRUSTLAW DEVELOPMENTS
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of premium movie channels."'0 It obtained a consent decree, which did not
go into effect only because the proposed merger did not materialize,
designed to protect the interests of independent content producers.,
Similarly, the Justice Department expressed concern with a merger of a
major cable system operator, TCI, and a major program producer, Liberty
Media Corporation." 2 It obtained a consent decree to limit feared anticompetitive effects on TCI's competitors who might otherwise be denied
access to Liberty Media's programming. 3 The consent decree also aimed
to protect competing programmers who might be disadvantaged in
providing programming to TCI's cable operating systems.
This examination of antitrust indicates that if limited in the media area
to economic efficiency concerns, antitrust law would be inadequate to
serve the value of audience choice. A limitation of even this broader focus
on audiences' choice should, however, be noted. Even the broader
conception in the end adopts a commodity perspective. The concern is
with the availability to audiences of a choice among commodities. This is
hardly the only possible normative concern ofmedia concentration policy.
The value of audience choice must be distinguished from concerns with
power per se, with maximizing the number of media speakers, or with
broadly distributing communicative power. For example, neither an
efficiency nor a marketplace of ideas approach is bothered by newspaper
chain ownership if the papers do not compete for the same audience-that
is, if each is located in and "local" to a separate city. Owning more than
seven TV or radio stations, if each is in a different city (with nonoverlapping signals), normally creates neither power over prices nor power
to restrict alternatives available to any given consumer. If these types of
ownership concentration are a concern, even antitrust law informed by
non-economic, media-specific concerns will be insufficient. Media
specific regulation would be required-and, since the early days of the
FCC, such regulation has existed.
B. Media-Specific Rules
Media specific concentration rules might be divided among those
concerned with local concentration, national concentration, and what is
usually a sub-category of the former, cross-ownership. The original
framework developed over much of the twentieth century will be
considered before turning to more recent changes.

110.
111.
112.
113.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 355.
Id.
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1. Local Concentration
Print and cable, as well as broadcasting, have been subject to media
specific concentration policies. This point is important because it is often
blithely asserted that broadcasting, where federal licensing was introduced
as a means to1' respond to the "chaos" of unregulated use of the airwave
"commons,"
is the only area where special regulation of First
Amendment protected mass mediamakes sense m and academic writing
increasingly challenges the constitutionality of regulation even in the
broadcast arena." 6
The newspaper industry long argued that the First Amendment forbids
the application of even general regulatory laws, such as antitrust
legislation, to newspapers-a view long since rejected by the Court.

17 As

a more plausible fall back position, special structural regulation of
newspapers is often asserted to be contrary to bedrock First Amendment
principles. The NPA, discussed in the last part,"' is a prominent example
that puts the lie to that assertion.
Congress adopted the NPA in response to industry lobbying after the
Supreme Court decision found a JOA-whereby two newspapers in a
single city combined their business operations, split the profits in a
prearranged manner, but keep separate and independent editorial
staffs-to violate the antitrust laws." 9 The NPA has considerable
jurisprudential significance. As noted earlier, the NPA is not merely a
special privilege for newspapers; it is a benefit for those papers forming
a JOA but a likely competitive obstacle for other local papers-a fact seen
from the beginning by newspapers and some members of Congress.
Judicial decisions upholding the NPA against constitutional attack,
premised on the differential and unfavorable treatment of some papers,
imply the propriety of legislation that has an undoubted purpose of

114. This chaos/commons quality arguably provides the best understanding both of federal
intervention in broadcasting and of the Court's opinions in crucial cases such as Red Lion Broad.
Co. v. FCC,395 U.S. 367 (1969). See Baker,supranote 39, at 102. The standard view-which may
be more easily described, but which is also more vulnerable to savage and effective critique-is
that an inherent scarcity of broadcast frequencies justified government regulation.
115. I have argued elsewhere that this view is wrong both normatively and descriptively.

Baker, supranote 39. In support of the view that structural regulation is generally permitted, note
that possibly the primary case relied upon by the Court in Red Lion for upholding structural
regulatory power aimed at increasing diversity in the marketplace of ideas was Associated Press
v. UnitedStates, 326 U.S. 1 (1945), a case involving newspapers. RedLion, 395 U.S. at 387, 390,
392.
116. See, e.g., MatthewL. Spitzer, The ConstitutionalityofLicensingBroadcasters,64N.Y.U.

L. REV. 990 (1989).
117. Associated Press, 326 U.S. at 1.

118. See Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103 (1937); Associated Press,326 U.S. 1.
119. Citizen Publ'g Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131, 140 (1969).
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improving the communications order as a whole even if the legislation
overtly works to the disadvantage of some media entities. 20
The NPA is not the only newspaper-related ownership regulation. In
1975, the FCC barred joint ownership of a newspaper and local broadcast
station and, in "egregious" cases, required divestiture of existing
combinations.' The Court's unanimous decision'22 upholding the rule
against statutory and constitutional challenges has three important
jurisprudential implications. First, this limitation on newspapers makes
perfect sense if, as argued in Part I and as Justice Black declared,
constitutional protection of the press allows government structural
regulation to further the press' constitutional purposes."z If, however, a
newspaper is the essential rights bearing unit, it would seem questionable
to deny a newspaper, simply because it is a (constitutionally protected)
newspaper, an opportunity available to others-the opportunity to apply
for or purchase a broadcast license. Second, by approving the limitation
of divestitures to egregious cases, the Court made clear that newspaperspecific rules can discriminate among newspapers. 2" Third, although a
local newspaper-broadcasting combination might sometimes create power
to raise prices in the advertising market, the rule is not limited to these
cases. Thus, antitrust "efficiency" considerations cannot explain the rule.
Rather, just like the NPA, the rule only makes sense as an attempt to
maintain independent voices in the communications sphere.
Curiously, unlike with newspapers, regulation of cable ownership has
not tried to maintain as many independent, competing cable operators as
possible. As noted earlier, 2 ' there is a (contestable) economic logic to
maintaining a single local system regulated on behalf of diversity. Thus,
the norm was long for local governments to grant exclusive (monopoly)
franchises, with both the franchise agreement and federal law providing
120. Comm. for an Indep. P-I v. Hearst Corp., 704 F.2d 467,482-83 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
464 U.S. 892 (1983).
121. Amendment of Sections 73.34, 73.240, and 73.636 of the Comm.'s Rules Relating to
Multiple Ownership of Standard, FM, and Television Stations, 50 F.C.C.2d 1046 (1975). Long
sensitive to the issue, the FCC had originally decided to consider the issue on a case by case basis.
See Newspaper Ownership of Radio Stations, Notice of Dismissal of Proceeding, 9 Fed. Reg. 702

(1944).
122. FCC v. Nat'l Citizens Comm. for Broad., 436 U.S. 775 (1978). Interestingly, unlike
current doctrine that often employ a form of supposed heightened scrutiny, the Court simply
explained that "[t]he regulations are a reasonable means of promoting the public interest in
diversified mass communications; thus they do not violate the First Amendment...." Id. at 802
(emphasis added).
123. Associated Press, 326 U.S. at 20.
124. See Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439 (1991) (allowing tax distinction between cable
and satellite even if they were considered both video delivery media). The Court has also allowed
for tax distinctions among media in the same category. Id.
125. See supra text accompanying notes 25-27.
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for varying types of access channels and for carriage of independent
channels. This situation prevailed until the Supreme Court in 1986 cast
doubt upon the constitutionality of a monopoly franchise,126 a practice that
was then barred by the 1992 Cable Act.'
Despite the logic of having a single regulated cable system,
congressional and FCC policy once attempted to maintain independent
media voices by restricting ownership of cable systems by local telephone
companies, other local video delivery providers, local broadcast stations,
as well as by national broadcasting networks. More recently, however, the
1996 Telecommunications Act or FCC decisions made in light ofthe NPA
28
have either eliminated or relaxed all these cross-ownership restrictions.1
The most extensive restrictions on concentration apply to broadcasting.
In 1938, the FCC refused to grant a radio broadcasting license to an
applicant that already controlled another broadcast station in the area. The
decision began what became known as the "duopoly" rule, a refusal to
grant multiple licenses for similar types of facilities in the same broadcast
area to a single entity or to financially related entities.2 9 The FCC would
grant a single owner at most one each of several different types of
facilities-AM radio, FM radio, and television. It tightened this restriction
in 1971 when it adopted a rule generally forbidding a single owner from
holding a license for both a VHF television and a radio station within a
single community. 3 ' Earlier, in 1970, it prohibited cross-ownership in a
single community of a television station and a cable system, then a newly
developing category of video enterprise 3 ' and, as noted, in 1975 3it2
prohibited cross-ownership of a local newspaper and broadcast station.

126. Los Angeles v. Preferred Comm. Inc., 476 U.S. 488, 494 (1986).

127. 47 U.S.C. § 541 (1992).
128. Id. §§ 571-572 (eliminating cross-ownership bar for telephone companies);
Implementation of Sections 202(f), 202(i) and 301(i) of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 11
F.C.C.R. 15, 115 (1996); 47 C.F.R. §§ 21.912 (1996), 76.501(f) (1997) (removing limits in
communities where there was "effective competition"); FCC Broadcast Services; Radio Stations,
Television Stations, 65 Fed. Reg. 43,333,43,345-47 (July 13,2000) (leaving intact rule prohibiting
cross-ownership of cable system and local broadcaster, although statutory barhas been eliminated).
More detail on the cable cross ownership rules can be found in HARVEY L. ZUCKMAN ET AL.,
MODERN COMMUNICATION LAW 1148-52 (1999).
129. MARC A. FRANKLIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON MASS MEDIA LAW 847 (3d ed. 1987);
Rules Governing Standard and High Frequency Broadcast Stations, § 3.228(a), 5 Fed. Reg. 2382,
2384 (1940). "Attribution" rules determine when formally independent corporate entities are
sufficiently connected financially to bring the ownership restrictions into play.
130. Multiple Ownership of Standard, FM and TV Broadcast Stations, 28 F.C.C.2d 662, 679
(1971). In contrast to the preferred VHF television licenses, combinations were allowed involving
the economically and technologically less attractive UHF television licenses. Id. at 673-74.
131. Comm. Antenna Television Sys., Second Report and Order, 23 F.C.C.2d 816 (1970).
132. See supratext accompanying note 121.
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These strict limits on local concentration are inexplicable from an
antitrust perspective limited to a concern with power over pricing and
economic efficiency.133 Rather, the rules seem consistently aimed at
maximizing the number ofindependent media voices.3 4 Only this explains
the NPA. This goal also provides the most obvious explanation of the
general prohibitions on cross-ownership. Clearly, the one-to-a-market rule
in respect to broadcast services is not needed, in many contexts, by the
concern with economic market power but rather directly embodies a
judgment that more separate voices are better.
2. National Concentration
In contrast to its relevance for local concentration, antitrust theory
provides little reason to object, except maybe in extreme circumstances,' 35
to what might be called "national concentration"--ownership by a single
firm of many local media entities each engaged in communication in a
separate geographic market. Since these firms do not compete against each
other, there is little "economic" reason to prevent their combination.
Nevertheless, ownership of multiple non-competing media entities has
long been a concern both in the United States and elsewhere. In respect to
print, the post-war coalition government in France in 1944 may have

133. Even a broader antitrust approach that maintained a concern with the continued vitality
of competition in amarketplace of ideas or with audience choice, see, e.g., Stucke & Grunes,supra
note 10, would not explain the goal of maintaining such a wide distribution of ownership. In fact,
sometimes the antitrust analysis could find the ownership restrictions to be positively perverse as
impediments to both efficiency and the diversity of products provided to consumers. For example,
the owner of multiple local broadcast channels has little reason to offer programming that competes
against its other programming. Rather than engage in "ruinous" competition for the same dominant
market, the owner of multiple competing media entities is more likely than separate owners to use
them to respond to different sorts of preferences, thereby garnering a larger overall audience, and
by the same token producing diversity of a sort. See BRUCE M. OWEN & STEVEN S. WILDMAN,
VIDEO EcONOMICS (1992); Matthew L. Spitzer, JustifyingMinority Preferences in Broadcasting,
64 CAL. L. REV. 293, 304-16 (1991).
134. Most rules had exceptions that allowed cross-ownership or multiple ownership when that
seemed the only practical way to have the service offered at all. These exceptions hardly contradict
the general point.
135. The extreme circumstance is where the national concentration is so great that the owner
could exercise distorting power as a buyer of media content. This was the only policy concern that
the appellate court recognized as a possible basis for the FCC to limit ownership of cable systems
nationally. Time Warner Entm't Co. v. FCC, 240 F.3d 1126, 1133 (D.C. Cir. 2001). Interestingly,
the FCC rule would have guaranteed that there be at least four owners nationally. Using the Justice
Department's HHI index, a market divided among four enterprises would receive a score of at least
2500, while as a rule of thumb the Justice Department considered any market with a score of over
1800 as highly concentrated, suggesting an antitrust problem. The court, however, could only
justify a rule limiting ownership to 60% of the country's cable systems, a rule that would guarantee
only two owners and a HHI of at least 5200. Id. at 1136.
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adopted the most restrictive rule.'36 Although never effectively enforced,
it prohibited any individual or company from owning more than one daily
newspaper. 137
In the United States, despite the general policy concerns being
applicable to all media of communications, the most important legal
restraints on national concentration have applied to broadcasting and, to
a much lesser extent, to cable. 13' Regulation began in the 1940s, when the
FCC explicitly limited ownership to six FM radio stations and three
television stations. 39 It loosened this limit in 1953, allowing ownership of
up to seven stations in each service category--AM radio, FM radio, and
television. 41 It also141prohibited any entity's ownership of more than one
broadcast network.
These ownership rules were not the only ways that the FCC tried to
maintain independent media voices. Because of huge economies of scale,
networks have long been of major importance, especially in packaging and

distributing program content for broadcasters. The economics of
broadcasting made it likely that, if left to market decisions, many local

stations would generally broadcast material produced, distributed, and
scheduled by one of the several national networks. Moreover, in its

136. HUMPHREYS, supra note I, at 96.
137. Id. In the United States, the merits of "chain" ownership of newspapers has been a
constant theme of both general commentary and social science research efforts. For example, one
survey showed that 70% of journalism educators and 70% of "national leaders" thought
"concentration of media ownership is athreat to the free flow of information to the public." Barbara
W. Hartung, Attitudes Toward the Application of the HutchinsReport on PressResponsibility, 58
JOURNALISMQ. 428,432 (1981). Although the quality ofthe research design and analysis has been
often quite low, and social science research and the appropriate conclusions to be drawn are
disputed, in my review of nearly two dozen studies, I concluded that the research indicated some
net negative consequences of chain ownership. More importantly, however, the research failed to
adequately theorize or investigate the factors that should be of greatest concern, and the ways in
which chain ownership was most likely to be objectionable. See C. Edwin Baker, Ownership of
Newspapers: The View from Positivist Social Science (1994) (Res. Pap. R-12, Joan Shorenstein
Center, Harvard U.).
138. Cable was discussed earlier, see supra text accompanying notes 53-59, and will not be
re-examined here. As noted, at the direction of Congress, the FCC limited any company from
owning more than, roughly, 30% ofthe country's cable systems-a very minimal restriction when
compared to a maximum of seven AM, FM, and TV stations that a company could own. Although
the Supreme Court unanimously upheld the restrictive broadcasting limit, the Court of Appeals
subsequently rejected the limit on cable ownership as unjustified. CompareUnited States v. Storer
Broad. Co., 351 U.S. 192 (1956), with Time Warner,240 F.3d at 1126.
139. This history is summarized in Amendment of Section 73.3555 of the Comm.'s Rules
Relating to Multiple Ownership of AM, FM and Tel. Broad. Stations, 100 F.C.C.2d 17 (1984).
140. See Rules and Regulations Related to Multiple Ownership of AM, FM and Television
Broad. Stations, 18 F.C.C. 288, 295 (1953); StorerBroad., 351 U.S. 192 (upholding rules).
141. Rules and Regulations Governing Commercial Television, § 4.226, 6 Fed. Reg. 2284,
2285 (1941).
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network affiliation agreement, a profit-oriented local station would be
willing to bargain away its option to do anything else, ceding most
programming control to the network. The FCC sensibly believed that any
evil created by concentration could equally result from formally separately
owned broadcast stations contractually handing over editorial control to
a single entity. Ownership dispersion was designed not just to generate
separate station ownership but also to assure a plurality of people and
firms making independent programming decisions. Thus, early on, the
FCC adopted a panoply of rules designed to keep ultimate control and
responsibility in the hands of individual licensees by preventing control
being transferred through contractual agreements to a national
network-the so called "chain broadcasting" rules. 42 The Court upheld
these essentially anti-concentration
rules against statutory and First
43
Amendment attack.
The differences between the older FCC and the more recent Chicago
School antitrust responses to concentration are clear. FCC ownership
policy was never concerned solely or even primarily with monopoly
market power, on either a local or a national level. Instead, the FCC
focused on ownership dispersal and on multiplying the number and
pluralism of independent media voices. Numerous FCC policies and
practices serve as illustrations. In addition to technical qualifications
necessary to obtain a broadcast license, the FCC in its comparative
licensing process asserted two primary objectives: quality of broadcast
service and, "a maximum diffusion of control of the media of mass
communication."' It announced that it would favor license applicants that
would contribute to the "[d]iversification of control of the media of mass
communications; ' ' 41 in addition, it would favor applicants that promise
"[f]ull time participation in station operation by owners."'146 This last factor
effectively favored both local ownership and, in a sense, worker ownership
or, at least, owners' hands-on-management, as well as general diffusion of
control. The FCC also adopted rules designed to promote ownership by
47
women and minorities, hoping to expand the pluralism of media voices.

142. Nat'l Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 193 (1943).
143. Id. at 226-27. These rules have been repealed in respect to radio but, to some extent, have
continued to apply to television. 47 C.F.R. § 73.658 (2000). Even as to television, in its
deregulatory frenzy the FCC eliminated several restrictions that it concluded are obsolete. Review
of the Commission's Regulations Governing Television Broadcasting, 10 F.C.C.2d 4538 (1995).
144. Policy Statement on Comparative Broadcast Hearings, I F.C.C.2d 393, 394 (1965)
(emphasis added).
145. Id.
146. Id. at 395. After almost thirty years, this "'integration' of ownership and management"
criterion was found to be unjustified by the court. See Bechtel v. FCC, 10 F.3d 875, 877,887 (D.C.
Cir. 1993).
147. Statement of Policy on Minority Ownership of Broad. Facilities, 68 F.C.C.2d 979, 983
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Another illustration is the FCC policy goal of providing television
stations for most local communities. In order to control signal interference,
the FCC's local-oriented allocation meant that (for a long period of time)
many communities were reached by no more than three stations. The result
was that the market did not support more than three networks, which
apparently need local affiliates covering most of the country in order to
succeed financially. Those favoring more market competitionattacked this
localism policy, pointing out that allowing larger stations with broader
reach would have allowed most communities to be reached by at least four
stations, encouraging earlier creation of more than the three competing
television networks that dominated broadcasting from the 1950s to the
1980s. Even assuming as I do, that these critics were right in saying that
this FCC policy prevented greater network competition and reduced
viewing choice for the average audience, that should not end the argument.
The FCC policy supported the goals of providing local communities with
their own mediums of communication and of increasing the total number
of owner/participants in the broadcasting realm. Given that aim, consistent
with all its other policies, the FCC practice made perfect sense. The
problem was not FCC stupidity, as critics sometimes imply, but was
whether the Chicago School's crabbed vision of proper policy objectives
should be accepted.
In sum, licensing rules directly favored dispersal of ownership and
limited concentrated ownership, favored integration of ownership and
control, required the owner to bear ultimate responsibility for broadcasts
thereby limiting network power over local stations, and promoted
broadcasting in as many communities as possible. These policies have in
common a goal of increasing the number of decision makers who make
choices about what content to broadcast. This dispersal itself, not
competition or similar concerns of an efficiency oriented antitrust policy
or even audience choice, was clearly central to FCC policy.
3. Changed Directions
Neither the regulatory policy, pervasive in broadcasting but also
influential in relation to newspapers and cable, nor the understanding of
its theoretical foundations were to last. By 1982, a move toward so-called
deregulation in broadcasting had begun. That year, Mark Fowler, later
Chair of the FCC, and Daniel Brenner published their famous article

(1978). The policies in respect to minorities were upheld against a constitutional challenge of race
discrimination in a 5-4 decision by Justice William Brennan in his last opinion for the Court. Metro
Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 564-65 (1990). The case's approach to affirmative action,
although not the specific constitutional holding related to the FCC policy, has since been overruled.

Adarand Constructors Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 228 (1995).
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advocating a marketplace approach to broadcast regulation. 141 In 1984, the
FCC expanded the national limits on station ownership from the 7-7-7 rule
to a 12-12-12 rule and added a sunset provision aimed at entirely
eliminating FCC restrictions on concentration in six years.1 49 Largely due
to pressure from Congress, the FCC pulled back slightly. For example, it
eliminated the sunset provision and limited ownership within a given
broadcast category to stations that together reached no more than twentyfive percent of the national audience. 50
Still, the trend had been set. In 1992, the FCC expanded permissible
ownership for radio to eighteen AM and eighteen FM stations."'
Congress, which had previously slowed the FCC, responded to intense
industry lobbying and energized the shift toward reliance on the market
with the Telecommunications Act of 1996.52 The Act eliminated the
statutory restriction (but not the FCC rules) on cross-ownership of cable
systems and either a local broadcast station or a broadcast network.'
Congress removed all limits on the total number of radio or television
stations that could be jointly owned, leaving radio ownership
1 54
unregulated-which resulted in an immediate "orgy of consolidation."
For television, the Act increased the proportion of the national audience
that the single ownership group could reach from twenty-five percent to
thirty-five percent. 55 Finally, the Act directed the FCC to reconsider most
remaining ownership limitations. 5 6 Thus, in 1998, the FCC began
proceedings to consider eliminating the rule prohibiting
148. Mark S. Fowler& Daniel L. Brenner, A MarketplaceApproach to BroadcastRegulation,
60 TEX.L. REV. 207 (1982).
149. Report and Order, Amendment of Section 73.3555 of the Commission's Rules Relating
to Multiple Ownership of AM, FM, and Television Braodcast Stations, 100 F.C.C.2d 17 (1984).
150. See generally Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr. & Richard M. Blaiklock, Enhancing The
Spectrum: Media Power,Democracy, and the Marketplace of Ideas, 2000 U. ILL. L. REv. 813.
Greater reach was allowed if the owner partnered with owners coming from aracial minority group.
This represented a common FCC strategy employed in several contexts to allow apartial exemption
from a burdensome rule if the licensee acted in a way to increase minority ownership or control of
broadcast licenses. Id. These policies are mostly outside the scope of this Article.
151. Revision of Radio Rules and Policies, 57 Fed. Reg. 42,701-01, § 73.555(e)(1)(i) (1992).
152. For a good, critical review, see PATRICIA AUFDERHEIDE, COMMUNICATIONS POLICY AND
THE PUBLIC INTEREST: THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1996 (1999).

153. Revision of Radio Rules and Policies, 57 Fed. Reg. 42,701-01, §§ 202(I), 202(f) (1992).
154. Krotoszynski & Blaiklock, supra note 150, at 815 n.7. For example, at the time of the
1996 Act, the largest radio ownership group consisted of less than forty stations. Federal
Communications Commission Issues Biennial Regulatory Review Report for the Year 2000, Doe.
No. 00-75,2001 FCC LEXIS 378 (Jan. 17,2001) [hereafter Biennial Report 2000], at *96-97, 111.
By September 2000, a single owner held over 1,000 of the country's 12,600 stations and several
other owners had more than 100 stations each. Id.
155. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56, § 202(c)(1)(B)
(1996).
156. Id. § 202(c)(2).
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newspaper/broadcaster cross-ownership in a single community. It initiated
proceedings to eliminate the remaining "chain broadcasting" or network
rules-the rules unanimously upheld by the Supreme Court in 1943.' In
1999, the FCC adopted new rules allowing more joint ownership of
broadcast facilities within a community.'58 First, these rules narrowed the
situations where two stations would be considered overlapping for
purposes of the ownership restraints. 59 Second, they expanded the
circumstances in which a firm could own two television stations and up to
six radio stations in a single local market. 6 '
A complete, up-to-date list of current rules might not be important
here, in part because it is likely to soon be out-of-date. The general point
is clear. Up until the early 1980s, FCC policy basically aimed to restrict
ownership concentration both locally and nationally. Local ownership
combinations were usually allowed only when combined ownership was
expected to be the only way to provide that broadcast service to the area.
Even then, multiple ownership was permitted only if the combined service
seemed particularly valuable. The presumption was relentlessly against
concentration and toward maximizing the number of independent media
voices. Since the early 1980s, the orientation has flipped. The policy
direction has been toward eliminating legal restraints on concentration.
The presumption favors mergers unless clear and specific problems with
a combination could be shown. Interestingly, one consequence is that
157. See Nat'l Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190,226-27 (1943); see alsosupratext
accompanying note 143.
158. FCC Revises Local Television Ownership Rules, Rep. No. MM 99-8, 1999 FCC LEXIS
3736 (Aug. 5, 1999).
159. Id.
160. Id. One consequence of this rule was that it allowed the merger, announced shortly after
the rule's adoption, of CBS and Viacom. Since ownership of two stations in a market was now
permitted, the merged company's overlapping stations were, for the most part no longer a problem.
Still, the merged company faced the FCC's thirty-five percent television audience cap and the bar
on owning two networks, with the FCC requiring that they conform over time. At the time of this
writing, the FCC has just announced that a merger of a major (e.g., CBS) with a minor network
(e.g., UPN) would henceforth be allowed. Press Statement, Dual Network Report and Order,
Michael K. Powell, 2001 FCC LEXIS 2164 Apr. 19,2001. Permitting ownership of two television
stations also leads to a prediction concerning the response to the thirty-five percent cap. Under this
rule, Viacom could trade stations with another media conglomerate, News Corp. (Fox), whose
expected purchase of stations from Chris-Craft would also put its audience reach over the top. The
trade would give each conglomerate a second television station in a market in which it already
owns one and where the two conglomerates would otherwise compete. The trade would leave each
with duopolies in single cities, whose audience would only be counted once toward the cap on
audience reach. A likely reason that such a deal has not (yet) occurred is the high likelihood that
the FCC will soon increase or eliminate the percentage cap on audience reach or that the courts will
hold it unconstitutional, making the swap unnecessary. See Michele Greppi, Viacom StayPutsSwap
on Hold, ELECTRONIC MEDIA, Apr. 9, 2001, at 1; Press Release, FCC Approves Fox Chris-Craft
Merger with Conditions, FCC Lexis 4000 (July 25, 2001).
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antitrust law, interpreted as merely concerned with market power, has
become relevant. Thus, the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice
has been the remaining, although weaker, source of restrictions on the
recent consolidating trends in radio.161
Although not always clearly articulated, this endeavor to eliminate
ownership restrictions embodies four interrelated changes in basic
assumptions. First, most overtly, is a new unbounded and unprobed faith
in the market. The market will purportedly lead the concentrated but
competitive firms 6to
provide audiences with the variety and type of
2
content they want.
Second, maintenance (or creation) of competition is treated as virtually
the only important policy concern. Mostly, those favoring deregulation do
not answer the arguments ofthose favoring deconcentration, but rather are
tone deaf as to why anything other than inefficient monopoly power could
be a matter of concern. Wide dispersal of ownership had previously been
seen, in a sense, as a good in itself or, more programmatically, as the good
of simply providing for more independent voices, more opportunities to
be a broadcast "speaker," less concentrated power over public opinion, as
well as potentially more viewpoint diversity. Now, as long as competition
exists, wide dispersal of ownership is seen as unimportant in itself and
possibly inefficient. 63 From this new perspective, the FCC appropriately
allows multiple ownership within a local community as long as an
adequate number of competing firms continue to prevent the concentrated
firm from having monopoly power over advertising rates. This focus on
economic competition makes national limits hard tojustify. Ownership of
multiple geographically separated stations does not reduce competition in
any observable geographic market." (This same consideration explains
why chain ownership of daily newspapers in different areas usually raises
no antitrust issue.)
Third, policy commentators often observe competition coming from an
increasing number of directions. Relevant competition could come from
many sources other than those providing the particular media service at

161. See generallyZUCKMANETAL., supranote 128, at 1206; Leeper, supra note 92; Rathbun,
supranote 87; Teinowitz & Wilke, supra note 87.
162. I systematically critique this assumption in C. EDWIN BAKER, MEDIA, MARKETS, AND
DEMOCRACY, Part 1 (2002).
163. This characterization is impressionistic, and I would like to be wrong. The FCC still
sometimes asserts that pluralism of ownership diversity promotes competition within the
marketplace of ideas. My impression is, however, that today this diversity concern is almost an
afterthought, much less likely than previously to be the determinative consideration in any decision
and is instead window dressing. Generally, the (unjustified) assumption is that the competitive
market will provide the degree of diversity people want. See id.
164. This was, of course, the underlying policy assumption of the lower court in Time Warner.
See supra text accompanying notes 53-59.
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issue. In its most extreme form, this perspective sees all media as
competing with each other, or even more grandly, views media as merely
being a form of entertainment that is not too concentrated as long as other
forms of entertainment are available. If media competition is not found
elsewhere, it is now said that the Internet provides (or will soon provide)
all the competition we want-maybe more.
Finally, although not articulated as a specific policy premise, the
regulatory change likely reflects an increasing willingness to bow to
industry wishes for profits or corporate aggrandizement. In fact, given
their (questionable) assumption that American firms need to be huge in
order to dominate globally, government policymakers, sometimes
explicitly for that reason, recommend that ownership concentration be less
restrained by government 16 5 -a consideration related to power and profits
but hardly focused on providing the media needed by the American people
either in their role as consumers or as citizens.
4. Summary
The comparisons of general antitrust law and media-specific ownership
regulation and of the dominant history of media-specific law with the
deregulatory approach of the last twenty years paint a fairly clear picture.
Antitrust regulation of the media could serve many values in addition to
narrowly defined economic efficiency-values such as promotion of
consumer choice. Media concentration would be restricted in promoting
such values. Nevertheless, in practice, the market power to inefficiently
raise prices and to transfer wealth from buyers to sellers has been almost
evident in recent application of antitrust laws in the media
the sole concern
66
context.1
In contrast, neither Congress nor the FCC focused on economic
efficiency in developing the media specific ownership rules (which were
routinely upheld by the courts). Historically, media-specific policy
concerns clearly related primarily to the democratic or pluralist structure
of participation in the communications order-the interest that Justice
Black so famously endorsed inAssociatedPress167 -and to the prevention
of any firm accumulating excessive communicative power. Only such
values can justify or explain the FCC broadcast regulations discussed
above. The repudiation of a simply economics-based antitrust approach

165. U.S. Department of Commerce, Globalization of the Mass Media (U.S.G.P.O., 1993).
Similarly, the need to compete internationally, especially with America, has been a major force
driving deregulation in the media sphere in Europe. See generally HuL-MPHYS, supranote 1.
166. But see Hawaii v. Gannett, 99 F. Supp. 2d 1241, 1249-50 (D. Haw.), affid, 203 F.3d 832

(9th Cir. 1999); supra text accompanying note 99.
167. See Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945), quoted supra note 34.
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was even more overt when Congress revived JOAs after courts found them
often inconsistent with antitrust rules. The NPA represents a
Congressional judgment that a likelihood of greater economic exploitation
by a JOA's more concentrated, potentially monopolistic market power
(especially over advertisers and maybe over revenue derived directly from
sales to newspaper readers) was acceptable if it increased the likelihood
that independent editorial voices remained alive-a goal similar to that
embodied in the broadcast rules.
Early on, cable franchising policy was arguably aimed at allowing
concentration. That practice, too, would seem to contradict the antitrust
premise that competition best serves society. A number of grounds, not all
ofthem benign, might explain local cable franchise monopolies. Although
now prohibited by statute, two structural policy arguments provide
exclusive local franchises with their most legitimatejustification. First, the
practice represents a plausible judgment that competing cable systems,
laying their own wires and duplicating each others infrastructure costs,
even if supported by the market, wastes resources (the economic notion of
"ruinous competition") and, hence, is an undesirable form of competition.
Dispersal of power and plurality of voices, however, remained of prime
importance. The aim was to promote these goals without wasting these
resources. Thus, legal requirements included not only rate regulation, but
also mandates that channel space be made available to independent
programmers-a regulation that would increase the number of entities
with a guaranteed legal right to communicate over cable. More
importantly, government regulation could direct that some savings
generated by avoiding this wasteful competition, combined with some
revenue from "monopoly" pricing, be used to support forms of
communication content and expressive forums-illustrated by the public
access, governmental, and educational channels-that add to diversity and
potentially to consumer welfare.
Nevertheless, more recently, many if not most media-specific
regulations described above have been rejected--either by Congressional,
agency, or court action. Although more discussion of the policy rhetoric
would be necessary to prove the point, I believe this process of change has
been aided and rationalized by commentators, courts, and policy makers
adopting one or both of two rhetorical stances. Often they argue (or more
likely assume) that only an economic efficiency goal, of the sort attributed
to antitrust law, really (i.e., non-paternalistically) serves the public interest.
Given this assumption, they can then show that the regulations are quite
irrational in their service of the goal that they posited. Alternatively, they
argue that any supportable non-economic value in fact will turn out to be
well-served by competitive market behavior and ill-served by regulatory
control of ownership. Parts III and IV will consider arguments for and
against these views.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol54/iss5/1

34

Baker: Media Concentration: Giving Up on Democracy
MEDIA CONCENTRATION

III. OWNERSHIP IS NOT A PROBLEM

Legal regulation of ownership presumably reflects a fear of
concentration. There are, however, other related possibilities. A policy
focus on ownership could also, or instead, reflect concerns about who
owns the media, that is, about traits of the owners. The policy goal might
be to disperse ownership among different groups or to have both liberal
and conservative owners. Maybe local rather than absentee owners or
maybe ownership integrated with management would predictably provide
higher quality media content (under some obviously contestable concept
of "quality") and better serve either consumer or democratic needs. FCC
licensing policy has embodied all of these views. Such concerns provide
a basis for the widespread critique of newspaper chain ownership.
Arguably, firms rooted in the media business would produce better content
than they would if marginalized as "profit centers" of conglomerate firms
that operate primarily in other lines of business. 6 ' Or maybe it would be
desirable if ownership took varying forms, with different forms of
economic bases.' 69 Finally, the real issue often may be control,for which
ownership is a loose but imperfect proxy. 70 The degree to which it is a
168. C.K. McClatchy, a respected editor and chair of a newspaper chain, indicated that his
greatest fear was that newspapers would be run by conglomerates, such as Mobil. He argued that
"good newspapers are almost always run by good newspaper people; they are almost never run by
good bankers or good accountants." C.K McClatchy, How NewspapersAre Owned-AndDoes It
Matter?, 23 PRESS ENTERPRISE LECTURE SERIES 7-8 (1988). In conversation, Warren Phillips,
former editor of the WallStreetJournaland CEO of Dow Jones, made a similar point, emphasizing
the importance placed on having the publisher come from the journalistic rather than the business
side of the company (conversation with author, Fall 1992, Cambridge, MA). See also Bill Kovach,
Big Deals, With JournalismThrown In, N.Y. TIMES, Aug 3, 1995, at A25.
169. I will later endorse James Curran's recommendations to this effect. See infra text
accompanying note 310.
170. Justice O'Connor once argued that "it is important to acknowledge one basic fact: The
question is not whether there will be control over who gets to speak over cable-the question is
who will have this control. Under the FCC's view, the answer is Congress .... Under my view,
the answer is the cable operator." Turner Broad. Sys. Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 683-84 (1994).
Justice O'Connor is right in her first step--the basic question is who will have control. She erred,
however, as she proceeded. As to the must carry issue in the Turner cases, for control to rest either
with the cable operator or with the local broadcast station, to which the FCC wanted to give a
carriage option, the claimant must look to law to determine whether she/he/it has that control-that
is, the law ultimately controls. Under one law, one private actor controls (as to any particular
decision); under another law, a different private actor controls. In eithercase, the ultimate source
of control-the law-is generally thought to be in the hands of Congress (or the states if not
preempted by Congress). O'Connor's claim ultimately amounts not to an argument in favor of
"owners"-Congress recognized the local broadcaster as "owner" of the decision whether a local
cable system would carry its channel-but in favor of replacing Congress with the Court as the
authority determining who "owned" that decision. Despite wanting "her view" to control here, at
other points, she was ready to recognize that Congress could ultimately control by adopting laws
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good proxy may vary given other legal rules and the sociological context.
Control over different issues-budget versus content, for instance-is not
always in the same hands. The ideal arrangements are hard to determine.
Still, policy should be concerned with whether the law aides or impedes
achieving better arrangements. 71 These matters are important-some will
be briefly addressed later. Concentration itself is routinely the central
matter raised by media critics, however, and will be the primary focus
here.
At least three arguments could be made to show that concentration
should not be a serious policy concern, at least not today. First, maybe the
market effectively requires (or encourages) owners, whoever they are, to
supply roughly the same diverse media products. If so, who owns the
media may not be very important. The market may or may not be a
desirable mechanism to determine media content-elsewhere I have
argued that market competitive processes respond well neither to people's
media preferences nor to citizens' media needs.' Such critiques show a
problem with (over) reliance on a market structure. They do not show,
however, that the identity of the owner matters.
Second, maybe ownership is now sufficiently dispersed that existing
or realistically threatened concentration poses no real problem. In fact,
even greater concentration might be beneficial.
Third, maybe the professional work habits ofthe journalists and writers
largely determine what media content actually gets produced and then sees
the light of day. Owners might not even try to control media content. But
even if they do try, whoever they are, they will not succeed except in
isolated instances. Occasional cases of actual successful ownership
intervention often create considerable stir, being subject to critical media
reports or exposes. These occasional occurrences, however, are the
exception that proves the rule. Owners may not seriously affect either the
nature of public life or the bulk of the communications received by the
public. Moreover, these essentially sociological claims about owners' lack
of control may apply even more fully to large scale (concentrated)
corporate organizations than to smaller entities, where an individual or
family owner often exercises more hands-on control. In any event, this
that give immediate control to a private party other than the cable operator-that is, she saw no
First Amendment problem with imposing common carriage requirements on at least some of the
cable channels. Id. at 684.
171. Possibly because Europeans more clearly recognize that the press is an institution for
which freedom must be seen as something referring to distributions of different decisionmaking
rights to different people as well as limits on the government, BARENDT, supra note 9, at 40-45,
legal policy often tries to respond to the needs of what is called "internal freedom" of the press,
sometimes involving the rights of editors against capital suppliers and journalists against both.
Compare HUMPHREYS, supra note 1, at 108-10, with infra note 258.
172. See BAKER, supra note 162.
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third claim argues that the focus on ownership is overstated in
contemporary discussion. I will present and respond to each claim
separately.
A. Market DeterminedPerformance
A widespread populist perspective offers a"power" critique" of media
concentration. It goes like this: Communications media exercise great
political and cultural power. Concentrated power is dangerous (i.e.,
"power corrupts . . ."). Ownership gives control over this power."
Therefore, concentrated ownership is dangerous and should be restricted.
A second, "bottom line" critique may be more prominent among media
professionals.175 The problem? MBAs running-and ruining-newsrooms!
Media managers fixated on the bottom line! Critics usually make their
point in two parts. First, a purportedly newly dominant "bottom line
mentality" is shown to undermine adequate performance ofthejournalistic
or creative function. Then, unwelcome "recent" developments-such as
the move toward ownership by media conglomerates and publicly traded
companies-are identified as the key culprits. That is, the critique goes:
the bottom line orientation injournalism: (i) is new (or increasing), (ii) is
a problem, and (iii) is caused by ownership.
Defenders of the existing order might respond to the "bottom line"
critique by challenging the first two elements. It is not clear that this
bottom line orientation is new. Reviews of media commentary throughout
the twentieth century would find the same complaint' 76 -although later in
this part I will discuss structural reasons to expect that recent ownership
changes have exacerbated the "problem." Still, even if not new, that hardly
means that the issue is not serious. If caused or exacerbated by
concentrated ownership, the historical observations should not satisfy
critics of concentration.
Defenders of the existing order also sometimes reply that critics have
offered little basis for criticizing this bottom line mentality. Traditional
economics explains that market competition provides people with what
they want. Deviating from this result would be objectionably paternalistic.

173. This critique provides the background assumption of most leftist complaints about the
media. See, e.g., HERMAN & MCCHESNEY, supra note 9.

174. These premises provide the logic of the title of one of the more influential academic
books about the media, JAMES CURRAN & JEAN SEATON, POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY: THE
PRESS AND BROADCASTING IN BRITAIN (5th ed. 1997).

175. Often found within articles in the ColumbiaJournalismReview, the critique is suggested
by Doug Underwood. See generally DOUG UNDERWOOD, WHEN MBAs RULE THE NEWSROOM:
HOW THE MARKETERS AND MANAGERS ARE RESHAPING TODAY'S MEDIA (1993).
176. Cf. UPTON SINCLAIR, THE BRASS CHECK: A STUDY OF AMERICAN JOURNALISM (1919);
GEORGE SELDES, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS (1935).
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I will not pause here to repeat my (or others') extensive criticism of this
77
pollyannaish view ofthe consequences of effective market competition.1
The key failing of this popular defense of the market is that economic
analysis of even the most traditional and conservative sort shows that, at
least in regard to media products, predictable consequences of truly
effective market competition are not so benign. The competitive market
provide for the preferences of the public
can be expected to grossly fail to
7
or for the needs of the citizen. 1
Defenders of existing order, however, might more plausibly take a
more radical tack that undercuts both "power" and "bottom line" critiques
of concentration. Their argument denies a correspondence between
ownership concentration and either power or the bottom line mentality.
The claim is that the market, not owners, determine media content.
Critiques of the existing performance of the media may be in order-but
if so, the critic should focus on market structures, not on ownership
concentration. This claim merits elaboration.
Market advocates praise and market critics disparage markets for the
same reason. A competitive market structure purportedly generates
pressures that dictate an enterprise's market behavior. 179 This shared
descriptive theory-the advocates and critics diverge only in their
evaluation-is based on two theoretical assumptions. First, to survive, a
market participant needs to capture at least enough revenue to replace its
capital-that is, to cover its costs. Second, given this first constraint and
given competition, the firm must provide a product at a price that satisfies
consumers as well as does everything that its competitors can supply at
that price. This structurally-created dynamic dictates a profit maximization
orientation (which market advocates often confuse with an efficiency
orientation..). Thus, the market-based firm must try to fulfill the moneybacked preferences of its customers as cheaply as possible-if it does not,
it will be undersold by a competitor and eventually go bankrupt.
This market dynamic produces profit-maximizing behavior and denies
the enterprise any freedom except to try to be as profitable as possible.
Consistent failure to achieve this market-dictated goal means eventual
exclusion from the market. (This account leaves real freedom of choice to

177. BAKER, supra note 162, Parts I and II.
178. See id.
179. Interestingly, this view tends to be shared by conservative market advocates and Marxistinfluenced economists but rejected by liberals whose individualistic orientation often leads them
to ignore structure and recommend that problems can be remedied primarily by teaching or
persuading elite decision makers to act more benignly.
180. Profit maximization is served, for example, by externalizing costs or undermining labor's
capacity to demand higher wages. Neither practice, however, increases "efficiency;" rather they
only affect wealth distribution.
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the realm of consumption-the realm Max Weber described as the
household, which is roughly comparable for these purposes with Jurgen
Habermas' concept of the lifeworld-where people individually or
discursively decide how to spend their money and their "free" time.181)
Market advocates praise the enforced responsiveness to consumer
demands while radical critics often criticize particular (alienated) behavior
dictated by this structure. Putting aside that debate, the important point on
which the market advocates and critics seem to agree is that wherever this
market dynamic operates, the identity of the owners makes little
difference. To be more precise, it must be admitted that some owners are
stupid or venial. The claim is only that over time market dynamics weed
out the stupid and defang the venial. The market leads eventually to the
same (optimal) production irrespective of any initially assumed set of
owners. What we get depends on people's market-expressed
preferences-regardless of whether this result is to be praised or
condemned. Even if too exclusive a focus on the bottom line is for some
reason bad, interventions to prevent concentration or to distribute
ownership differently is not the solution. Rather, the only "solution" would
be to develop alternatives to the market (or to restructure the market so
that its incentives operate more benignly). Indeed, I partially agree with
this point-as did Europe at the time it opted for public broadcasting
rather than the "American plan,"' 82 that is, an advertising-funded
commercial broadcasting system."8 3
Unless this analysis of market dynamics, at least in the media context,
is relevantly wrong, a policy concern with "who owns the media" is
misguided. Therefore, a defense of this policy concern requires some
critique of this account of the market. The claim could take the form of a
general denial-this account of market dynamics is wrong everywhere. I
have no wish to advance that general claim.'" Here, instead, I suggest that,
even if this dynamic is generally very powerful, at least two factors cause
it not to operate effectively in the media context and that this level of
slippage has huge policy relevance.
First, even if the market enforced a profit orientation, prospectively
identifying the profit maximizing content is an exceedingly difficult and

181. See generally 2 JORGEN HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION:
(Thomas McCarthy trans.,
Beacon Press ed. 1987) (1981).
182. ROBERTW. MCCHESNEY, TELECOMMUNICATIONS, MASS MEDIA, AND DEMOCRACY: THE
LIFEWORLD AND SYSTEM: A CRITIQUE OF FUNCTIONALIST REASON

BATTLE FOR THE CONTROL OF U.S. BROADCASTING, 1928-1935, at 100, 114, 126, 133 (1993).

183. Recent studies of public broadcasting in Europe suggest a deterioration of quality the
more the system relies on advertising for revenue. See HUMPHREYS, supra note 1, at 240-44.
184. I have actually relied on the claim that in other contexts this market dynamic is generally
effective. See C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 194-224 (1989).
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continuing task. Different owners or managers will make quite different
guesses. Even if all Hollywood studio heads wanted only to maximize
profits, they hardly know how (even if they willingly sacrifice other values
in the attempt). They constantly attempt different content strategies-and
a decision maker's one right guess does not mean that his/her next will be
so. For this reason, human decisions will always lead to significant, nonmarket determined variations in the content of media products. The
important point here is that this systematic error by all enterprises leaves
considerable room for different owners to make choices influenced in part
by other goals, such as personal ideology, without seriously sacrificing the
profits needed to avoid bankruptcy. Moreover, to the extent some owners
(or managers) are comparatively better than their competitors at finding
profitable strategies, their success simply provides more options for
"subsidizing" their other, non-profit maximizing aims, aims that often
involve choices about content. If either Murdoch or Berlusconi is good at
being profitable, this merely increases his opportunity to be ideological.
The second point, however, is more basic and maybe more important.
Like utilities, media products characteristically manifest an important
attribute of "public goods." Due to a significant portion of their cost being
their "first copy cost," with additional copies having a low to zero cost,
media products have declining average costs over the relevant range of
their supply curves. This fact makes the economic theory of monopolistic
competition applicable to media goods.' Attributes of monopolistic
competition distinguish it from so-called pure competition, the standard
model that underwrites the belief that a properly working market leads
inexorably to the best result (given acceptance of the market's "givens" of
market-expressed preferences and the existing distribution of wealth).
These differences have major relevance for policy analysis. In
monopolistic competition, products often prevail that do not have close,
certainly not identical, substitutes. This non-substitutability often allows
reaping of significant monopoly profits-although the nature of this
competition also means that some media products only succeed minimally.
The "potential" profit can be realized and taken out as profit. This is the
accusation lodged at corporate newspaper chains and cost-cutting network
news divisions. The market itself does not, however, require this profit
maximizing response as it does in the standard model ofpure competition.
Rather, owners (or managers) can instead spend the potential profit on
indulging (or "subsidizing") their choices about either content or price.
Actual accounts from the media industries amply illustrate this abstract
economic prediction. Andr6 Schiffrin described this process in the book

185. The classic text is

EDWARD HASTINGS CHAMBERLIN, THE THEORY OF MONOPOLISTIC

COMPETITION: A RE-ORIENTATION OF THE THEORY OF VALUE (8th ed.. 1962).
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publishing world.' He claims that, in the past, "serious" publishers would
find and maintain the loyalty of very profitable authors. 187 The publishers
would then self-consciously use these profits to sustain "good" but
unprofitable books.' This example is interesting, The model of pure
competition expects firms in industries with a relatively large number of
players, as book publishing has,"8 9 to be forced by competitive pressures
to adopt a profit maximizing strategy to survive. However, with monopoly
products-which include any copyrighted item-the potential exists at
each level to obtain monopoly profits. These potential profits can then be
"spent" on non-profit maximizing aims or values. In Schiffin's account,
authors who "make it" commercially often remain loyal to, that is,
subsidize, publishing houses. Although the market might force publishers
to "bind" authors in order to obtain sufficient revenue for the risky activity
of looking for the next best seller, author loyalty and publisher behavior
do not necessarily conform to this model. Schiffrin describes a process
where, instead, publishers consciously use this revenue to support serious,
but non-profitable entries in their list.'" Publishers, like many of their
"serious" authors, see themselves as "paying" themselves, not in high
salaries or fancy executive suites, but in the "currency" of freedom to
publish the books that they want to publish. 9 Of course, some might
object that these non-profit maximizing "expenditures" on editor-chosen
books are socially wasteful. That might be true if profit maximization led
to appropriate media production. But it does not. 92 For several reasons,
including considerable positive externalities associated with "good" books,
the behavior Schiffrin describes is likely to move book publishing closer
to a social optimum.
Of course, various responses to and uses of these monopoly profits are
possible. The market does not dictate how monopoly profits are spent.
186. ANDRt SCHIFFRIN, THE BUSINESS OF BOOKS: How INTERNATIONAL CONGLOMERATES
TOOK OVER PUBLISHING AND CHANGED THE WAY WE READ (2000).
187. See id. at 91, 95, 108.
188. Schiffrin proceeds to describe the elimination of this practice by the newly merged, huge
corporate owners of the major publishing houses, many of which are like Random House in
demanding that "each book should make money on its own and that one title should no longer be
allowed to subsidize another." Id. at 91.
189. Douglas Gomery concludes that "[i]n terms of the exploitation of concentrated
ownership, book publishing and sales have generated less problems than other mass media" and
in his terms, "book publishing must be judged as a loose and open oligopoly." BENJAMIN M.
COMPAINE & DOUGLAS GOMERY, WHO OWNS THE MEDIA?: COMPETITON AND CONCENTRATION

INTHE MASS MEDIA INDUSTRY 135, 136 (3d ed. 2000). Gomery reports U.S. government data as
listing 2,503 book publishing companies in the United States in 1992 but suggests even this number
is quite low because of the government's restrictive definition of publisher. Id. at 63-64.
190. See SCHIFFRIN, supra note 186, at 91, 95, 108.
191. Id. at 108.
192. See BAKER, supra note 162, Part I.
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Schiffrin claims that the new corporate conglomerate owners of the major
publishing houses, which now dominate the industry, 93 differ from the
former publishers in their priorities. 194 These conglomerate owners
squeeze much higher rates of return out of their monopoly
properties-targeting rates oftwelve to fifteen percent, where four percent
had formerly been the industry average-while ending the prior
publishers' commitment to making books more readily available to
audiences by keeping prices down.' 95 But, according to Schiffrin, while
this bottom line corporate objective now largely dominates, some potential
profits apparently are also spent to satisfy the new owners' political
values, reflecting a new "intolera[nce of] dissenting opinions" and
generally more conservative political views.' 96
This opportunity to serve alternative or multiple objectives is even
greater in other media sectors, such as with the daily newspaper sector.
High first copy costs, especially when there is not sufficient product
differentiation among papers, creates the condition for local daily paper
monopolies. Advertising encourages this lack of product differentiation in
newspapers (just as a somewhat different set of advertisers sometimes
encourages particular differentiations among niche magazines). The more
the local paper's revenue comes from advertisers who want the largest
possible reach among local consumers, the more the paper's profit
maximizing goal becomes securing the broadest, not the highest paying,
audience. Typically, an objective, non-partisan (de-differentiating) voice
that speaks equally to all segments of the community best serves this
aim. 97 The result is a pattern of one paper cities where, despite high

193. Data and reports here vary. Mark Crispen Miller asserts that seven companies dominated
book publishing as of 1998, and Gomery concludes that a dozen companies publish about half the
books sold in the country. COMPAINE & GOMERY, supra note 189, at 62, 135. Concentration may
also be greater within particular book categories.
194. See SCHIFFRIN, supra note 186, at 91.
195. See id. at 118-19.
196. See id. at 130-33, 136.
197. See Baker, supra note 7, at 7-44. Local daily competition is much more likely to be
profitable if: (i) there is partisan sponsorship of papers; (ii) the public is politically engaged and
consequently, desires a more partisan paper; (iii) other factors make the market much more
fundamentally divided (such as into different language groups); or (iv) advertising plays a less
significant role in the newspaper's financial success.
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"monopoly" profits,19 potential competing papers find it virtually
impossible to challenge the local monopolist.
Given a stable local monopoly, there still remains the question of how
to "spend" potential monopoly profits. Should these potential profits be
"cashed out," used to provide for greater access to the paper by pricing it
below the profit maximizing level,'9 9 used to pay for quality journalism,
used to support other (often political or ideological) agendas, or wasted
through inefficient (sometimes family) management?
Market dynamics push toward the first choice. Those who aim solely
at profit maximization will typically be able to offer more to buy an
existing monopoly paper than its current income stream is "financially"
worth to current owners (or other bidders), at least if those current owners
(or other bidders) have made one of the other choices. Thus, whenever
financial value becomes crucial to owners, for example, because of the
need to pay estate taxes or because some family heirs lose interest in the
paper and want the money, a transfer of control to buyers prepared to cash
out profits-rather than to subsidize quality journalism, personal or group
ideology, or public availability-becomes likely. The result explains the
continual complaint that the new owners, especially the publicly traded
chain corporations, constantly try (and are able) to impose higher and
higher profit rate expectations on their local management, leading to the
steady deterioration of journalistic quality."-°° Still, the nature of
monopolistic competition is that the market itself does not force this
choice on media owners.20 ' For this reason, who controls the newspaper
(or other media outlet) and decides on priorities makes a huge difference.

198. Average operating margins in daily newspapers in 1997 were 19.5%, an extraordinarily
high rate that should encourage new competitors except under conditions supporting "natural"
monopolies or when particular "legal monopolies," such as patents in the drug industry, protect
such profits. GILBERT CRANBERG ETAL., TAKING STOCK: JOURNALISM AND THE PUBLICLY TRADED
NEWSPAPER COMPANY 18 (2001); see also BAGDIKIAN, supra note 9, at 13; Comments of
Consumers Union et al., App. A (statement of Ben Bagdikian), In the Matter ofCross-Ownership
ofBroadcastStationsandNewspapers? Newspaper/Radio Cross-OwnershipWaiver Policy, MM
Docket Nos. 01-235, 96-197 (filed Dec. 3, 2001).
199. See generally William B. Blankenburg, Newspaper Ownership and Control of
Circulationto Increase Profits, 59 JOURNALISM Q. 390 (1982).
200. Historically, operating margins in the daily newspaper industry have been a relatively
high 10% to 15%, but now papers owned by the publicly traded companies range from 20% to 30%
or higher. CRANBERG ET AL., supra note 198, at 10; see idat 111 (describing rates moving from
historic norms of 8 to 10% to increasingly higher rates, now 30% or higher, and attributing the
change to replacement of owners with pride and involvement in the community to stock owners
only interested in profits).
201. Of course, profit maximization might be required after the potential income stream was
capitalized in the winning bid to purchase an existing monopoly paper. Cf.Todd Bonder, A
"Better" MarketplaceApproach to BroadcastRegulation, 36 FED. COMM. L.J. 27, 29, 68 (1984)
(noting and approving the possibility of this effect in an ideally structured broadcast arena).
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Contrary to the claims made from the perspective of the standard
economic model, monopolistic competition allows the owner to make
choices between goals of profit maximization, ideology, and product
quality (here journalistic quality), and greater, even though unprofitable,
circulation.
An additional feature of newspapers (and an analogous point may
apply to other media) leaves greater choice in the hands of owners than is
true for many consumer products. It may be the case-this is an empirical
issue that can vary from community to community-that the number of
readers that a paper would gain if the paper slants content choices toward
the owners' personal ideological or other agendas is not significantly less
than the number the paper loses through not adopting a more directly
profit maximizing content slant. The paper's monopoly position within the
community can make this possibility empirically more likely. Under these
conditions, the amount of profits that must be "spent" to indulge an
owner's particular non-market determined preferences may be quite
modest, maybe even less than public stockholders would note.
Empirical research on the difference newspaper ownership makes has
generally been of extraordinarily poor quality." 2 Still, this research
arguably suggests that the public benefits slightly from ownership by
private (e.g., family) independent firms rather than chain ownership by
publicly traded firms, although variations in quality are greater within than
between these ownership categories." 3 Both results are predictable on the
account given above. Choice, not merely market forces, influences quality
and leads to variation within ownership categories. Variation between
ownership categories is largely explicable on two grounds. First, different
pressures or incentives typically operate on different categories of owners.
Second, sociological characteristics of people filling the ownership role in
different ownership categories may vary systematically, not randomly.
Both factors lead to (statistically) different types of choices. Generally,
quality journalism (as well as ideological journalism) follows from choices
favoring values other than the bottom line. Corporate chains may provide
some efficiencies and management qualities that sometimes increase the
enterprise's potential for either profits or quality. The carrots and sticks
generally operating on executives (editors and publishers) in chain firms,
as well as the added pressures of public ownership, are, however, typically
directed toward increasing profits.2 In contrast, membership and

202. See generally C. EDWIN BAKER, OWNERSHIP OF NEWSPAPERS: THE VIEW FROM

POSITIVIST SOCIAL SCIENCE (1994) (literature review).
203. See id.
204. In their stinging critique of the consequences of public stock ownership of large
newspaper chains, this single-minded pursuit of profits is the major culprit that Cranberg et al.
identify as leading to the decline in the commitment to quality and to journalism. See CRANBERG
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involvement in a community may lead to dedication to the community's
welfare or to a desire for status in it. For these reasons, local ownership
might predictably lead to greater commitment to serve values other than
the bottom line.2" 5
In sum, the degree of choice available to media owners and the
"expense" of exercising choice may vary with context, especially with the
industrial structure of the particular media sector considered. As I have
argued elsewhere, the nature of market competition may generally force
successful producers of many consumer products to pursue profit
maximization to the detriment of virtually all conflicting goals.
Nevertheless, this section explains why this market determination
predictably operates much less forcefully in the context of monopolistic
competition, in general, and with respect to media products, in particular.
Thus, the identity of media owners matters-or, more specifically, the
identity of the people who controlthe media entity matters, whether these
people be owners, management, workers, or others.
B. Ownership is Diverse
The received wisdom is that the level of media concentration is high
and growing.20 6 Nevertheless, Benjamin Compaine, the lead author of
probably the most definitive book on media ownership in the United
States," 7 clearly does not view concentration as a problem. His answer to
the question: who owns the media, is: "thousands of large and small firms
and organizations... controlled, directly and indirectly, by hundreds of
thousands of stockholders, as well as by public opinion."2 8 He goes on to
ErAL., supra note 198, passim. In addtion to investor ownership, they identify various structural

practices, such as giving editors bonuses solely on the basis of financial criteria rather than product
quality or circulation criteria, by which this profit focus came to prevail. Id.
205. Id at 63 (views expressed by stock analysts about why family ownership leads to better
papers and public ownership leads to less investigative reporting and investment in editorial
content); id. at 108-09 (suggesting that profit is a less dominant concern of family or locally owned
papers where the owner's "profit was taken partly in the form of power and prestige... [and] in
the form of a stable of famous and celebrated writers").
206. See, e.g., BAGDIKIAN, supra note 9; HERMAN & MCCHESNEY, supra note 9.
207. COMPAINE & GoMERY, supra note 189.
208. Id, at 578. Compaine and his co-author strongly disagree, with Gomery's conclusions
being much closer to the received view. Still, some other informed observers are equally skeptical
about claims of concentration. See, e.g., Eli M. Noam, Media Concentrationin the United States:
Industry Trends andRegulatory Responses, availableat http://www.vii.org/papersmedconc.htm
(last visited Sept. 13, 2002). Although recognizing some arenas where media concentration is a
problem, Noam's main conclusions are that "[i]n the cyber-media future, scarcity and gatekeepers
will be largely eliminated" and that "it is unlikely that media conglomerates combining all aspects
of media will be successful in the long term." Id. On the same day (Aug. 24, 2001) that I first read
Noam's paper, I also read an online column by Norman Solomon, Denial and the Ravaging of
Cyberspace,where Solomon observed that "Websites operated by just four corporations account
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suggest that the news media market "may be noted more for information
overload and fragmentation than for concentration and scarcity."2 9
Basically, his claim is that the facts show, first, that concentration does not
exist; and second, because of the Internet, whatever concentrated media
' A review of his argument provides
power that did exist "is breaking up."21
an opportunity to consider how a policy analyst should think about media
concentration.
1. Not Concentrated: The Claim
Compaine suggests that the characterization of concentration or
monopolization should depend on answers to at least two questions: what
constitutes the relevant market and what level of concentration is too
much.2 ' It turns out that the answer to neither question is purely factual.
Rather, the answers depend on the reason for asking-that is, the reason
for a concern with concentration.
Alternative concerns are implicit in two different frameworks that
Compaine distinguishes for identifying when concentration is too great:
an antitrust standard and a sociopolitical standard concerned with the
needs of a flourishing democracy and free society.212 A society might
wisely consider the second to be more fundamental but, as Compaine
correctly observes, the second provides no clear or accepted criteria for

for 50.4 percent of the time that U.S. users of the Web are now spending online." Norman
Solomon, Denial and the Ravaging of Cyberspace, MEDIA BEAT, Aug. 23, 2001, at
http://www.fair.org/media-beat/010823.html.
209. COMPAINE & GOMERY, supra note 189, at 578. Compaine's point is a non-sequitur. A
claim that concentration exists and is a problem can be completely agnostic about issues of scarcity,
fragmentation, and information overload. Such non-sequiturs, as well as overtly false factual
claims, become even more prominent in Compaine's more popular writing. For example, he asks,
"what are the empirical facts," says he has reported the facts in his book, and then claims
McChesney's statement---"that there are fewer and larger companies controlling more and
more"-"is wrong." See Benjamin M. Compaine, The Myths of Encroaching Global Media
Ownership, OPEN DEMOCRACY, Nov. 6,2001, at http://www.opendemocracy.netdocument-store
Doc807-5.pdf. So, look at his book. There, his calculation relating to his list of the fifty largest
media companies show that they are bigger and control more (though not a lot more) of the industry
in 1997 than in 1986. COMPAINE & GOMERY, supra note 189, at 560-61. For example, Compaine
shows that between 1986 and 1997, despite becoming larger, CBS had not kept up, dropping from
being the largest media company to eleventh place. Id. In 1986, the largest firm according to
Compaine's method ofcalculating, had 5.61% ofthe business, while in 1997 the largest had 9.22%.
Id. at 560. The four largest had a 18.79% share in 1989 and a 24.13% share in 1997. Id.at 562. That
is, his data shows McChesney is right-fewer and larger companies are controlling more and more.
210. Id. at 579 (quoting Philip Meyer, Clinton-Crazy?No, Net Floods Us with News, USA
TODAY, Oct 4, 1998, at Opinion Column, News Section).
211. See id. at 537-79.
212. See id. at 547.
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measuring concentration.2" 3 Compaine then suggests that "the antitrust
standard is [presumably] intended to promote [the sociopolitical
standard]."2" 4 Purportedly, the antitrust standard directly includes (all?) the
sociopolitical concerns if the view of those who favor the "multivalued"
approach to antitrust is accepted. Nevertheless, at least for discursive
purposes, Compaine favors the dominant (Chicago) approach to antitrust,
which emphasizes economic efficiency and market power.2" 5 He defends
using the Chicago School approach on four grounds: it has the advantage
that its "criteria tend to be relatively identifiable, quantified and
validated[,] ... are less likely to run into First Amendment barriers,...
are [in many ways] reasonable surrogates for socio-political
criteria[,] ... [and] may be less susceptible to 'the law of unintended
consequences.""'2 6 If these claims are right, his antitrust focus should be
acceptable. His argument falters, of course, ifthere is reason to expect that
this Chicago approach would significantly diverge from concerns focused
on the needs of democracy and a free society-an objection, further
discussed below, that I emphasized in Part II.
In the Chicago School approach, the overt reason for concern with
concentration is to prevent firms from being able to raise prices in a
manner that leads to inefficient restrictions on production as well as to
transfers of wealth from consumers to the firm. Although in practice the
application of this approach is hardly mechanical, it provides theoretically
clear standards for identifying objectionable concentration-both in terms
of identifying markets and identifying when concentration is too great. A
relevant market is: any describable category of products and geography in
which a single monopoly firm, if it existed, would be able to exercise
power over pricing. The issue concerns cross-elasticity of demand between
items in this market category and any potentially competing items. That
is, a firm might be the only one to produce xs, but if consumers are just as
happy to substitute ys, which are made by many other firms, then the first
firm would have no power to raise the price ofx. Thus, the relevant market
would not be for xs, but for xs andys (assuming that some other product,
z, should not also be included because it is substitutable for xs orys).
Although many factors, including the existence or absence of barriers
to entry, can affect the characterization of a particular degree of
concentration within a market as being objectionably concentrated,

213. Id.
214. Id. Why this would be true is not explained. The objective of preventing an entity from
amassing economic power that allows it to inefficiently raise prices hardly seems td have any
necessary correspondence to a distribution of power over public opinion that ideally serves
democratic values. But see Stucke & Grunes, supra note 10.
215. COMPAINE& GOMERY, supra note 189, at 555.
216. Id. (emphasis added).
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antitrust regulators have developed a rule of thumb starting point for
identifying when concentration is too great. Compaine observes that they
apply the Herfmdahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), 21 7 with an industry score of
under 1,000 being considered unconcentrated, while a score of more than
1,800 suggests high concentration that often raises antitrust concerns.21
This Hl becomes a standard against which Compaine often makes his
comparisons.
Although Compaine is not entirely consistent in this, he implicitly
views the relevant market for his analysis to be the media as a whole, a
characterization that supports his conclusion that there is no problem of
concentration in the media. Thus, Compaine agrees that, if"[1]ooked at in
small, industry-specific pieces, there is indisputably consolidation in some
media segments .... ,2 1 9 But, he argues that if the media is considered "a
single industry, there can be little disagreement that there is more
competition than ever... " 20 In his policy discussions, Compaine clearly
inclines toward the second perspective-that of a single industry-as the
" ' Only this inclination, for example, can explain his
better approach.22
attention to the HHI index for the media industry as a whole, which he
concludes is 268, showing that the media industry is "one of the most
competitive major industries in U.S. commerce." 2 For antitrust analysis,
an H=I of 268 shows a very unconcentrated communications order.
Attention to this HIMI number, however, would be merely obscurantist
except for a belief that the media industry as a whole is an appropriate unit
of analysis.
2. Not Concentrated: The Critique
There are two problems with Compaine's argument. First, even from
a narrow, efficiency-oriented antitrust perspective, he is wrong to identify
the media as a whole as the relevant market. Second, he is wrong to think
that the antitrust criteria are "reasonable surrogates for socio-political
217. Id. at 558. The index score results from squaring the percentage of the market held by
each firm and then adding the squares. See idJ Thus, one firm that controlled the entire market
would have HHI often thousand. One thousand firms, each controlling 0.10/%, would have anetHHI
of ten.
218. Id. For antitrust purposes, often even a high HHI will not imply undue concentration, for
example, if barriers to entry are sufficiently low. Thus, antitrust regulators view the HHI as only
one tool of (initial) analysis.
219. Id. at 574.
220. Id.Actually, his own data may suggest otherwise, although the increase in concentration
may not be significant from an antitrust perspective. See generallysupra note 209.
221. See CAMPAlNE & GOMERY, supra note 189, at 573. This is also seen in his more popular
debates about concentration where he argues that the facts show that no concentration exists. See
Compaine, supra note 209.
222. CoMPAiNE & GOMERY, supra note 189, at 561, 562.
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criteria." 2" Once that is observed, it can be seen-or at least argued-that
alternative criteria justify conclusions that undesirable degrees of
concentration exist.
a. The Antitrust Perspective
In an antitrust perspective, market definition is crucial. For example,
if General Motors and Ford merged and DaimlerChrysler closed a moneylosing Chrysler, the market for so-called "American cars" would be
extremely concentrated (depending, of course, on the definition of
"American cars"), the market for "cars" would be much less so, the market
for transportation vehicles even less, while the market for "consumer
goods," of which cars are only one item, might remain extremely
unconcentrated. Which is the relevant market? For the antitrust analyst,
the issue involves price elasticity between American cars and cars,
between cars and transportation devices, or between transportation devices
and other consumer goods. If, when the price of cars went up slightly,
many people switched from buying cars and bought movie tickets,
cosmetics, or ice cream instead, the last characterization would be
right-but that is implausible. Although some elasticity may exist between
each category, almost surely the relevant category is cars. The antitrust
question is what is the relevant category in the media realm. Any
reflection shows that the media business as a whole is an incoherent basis
of definition.
First, whether or not supplied by the same firm, content and content
delivery are very different, non-substitutableproducts. Including both as
media enterprises to show lack of concentration is clearly misleading. At
times, Compaine recognizes, and even emphasizes, this point. Although
Compaine's rhetoric suggests a unified media framework and often, for
example, when he applies the HHI to the media as a whole, thereby
combining the media engaged in these alternative activities, he actually
emphasized that "media" involve "discrete types of activities," which he
describes as substance or content, process or delivery, and format or
display.22 Presumably, lack of concentration in one would not show that
another is not improperly concentrated. Imagine that delivery is much
more expensive than content creation, that there are ten roughly equal
sized "media" firms, with nine providing delivery and only one (due to
some barriers to entry, monopoly power reflecting first copy costs, or
other reasons) engaged in content creation. With each having about ten
percent of the revenue, the HHI score would be one thousand-basically
unconcentrated. Competition would appear robust. Clearly, however, one

223. See id.at 555.
224. Id. at 542.
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company controlling all content bespeaks monopoly. Problematic
concentration likewise exists ifthere are too few distributors and entry into
the distribution business is difficult. The two services-content creation
and content delivery-simply should not be included as part of the same
market for antitrust purposes. Given both the expense of delivery systems
and their potentially efficient operation as common carriers, Bruce Owen
argues that First Amendment rooted interests in diversity can generally be
best furthered by keeping the two separate and subjecting the second to
common carriage regulation.22 Owen hoped that this separation and
regulation would not only reduce economic barriers to entry into the
business of content creation and sale, but also would help prevent power
in one dimension, that is, power over delivery, from being leveraged to
exercise control over the communicative opportunities of content
creators. 226 Government regulation of content creation (which generally
should be barred by the First Amendment) is very problematic. Common
carriage regulation of the delivery business can, however, often advance
both desirable public policy and expressive freedom.
Congress and the FCC once took Owen's view seriously. For example,
they generally barred cross ownership of telephone companies and cable
systems.227 The hope was that, if kept separate, telephone systems
operating as common carriers would eventually provide necessary means
for new competitors to provide cable-type video content to households.228
Video suppliers other than cable companies, and maybe cable companies
themselves, could use telephone lines to distribute their content to
household consumers. Likewise, these same considerations provide an
explanation for imposing common carriage and rate regulation on other
distributors, the U.S. mail, telephone companies, cable system operators,229

225. See generally BRUCE OWEN, ECONOMICS AND FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION: MEDIA
STRUCTURE AND THE FiRST AMENDMENT (1975).

226. See generally id

227. 47 U.S.C. § 533(b) (1984).
228. This position did not fare well in the courts, Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. v. United
States, 42 F.3d 181 (4th Cir. 1994), vacated,516 U.S. 415 (1996); U.S. West, Inc. v. United States,
48 F.3d 1092 (9th Cir. 1994), vacated, 516 U.S. 1155 (1996) (subjecting it to an arguably
misguided First Amendment attack). Nor did it prevail in a deregulatory Congress, where the rule
was repealed by the 1996 Telecommunications Act. See C. Edwin Baker, Merging Phone and
Cable, 17 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 97 (1994).
229. Often, this separation is almost a reflex in First Amendment analysis. Thus, even
O'Connor's dissent in Turnerlindicated the acceptability of common carriage regulation of cable.
Turner I, 512 U.S. 622, 684 (1994). Although the Court reports no disagreement on the "initial
premise [that] ... cable operators... are entitled to the protection of the... First Amendment,"
id. at 636, rate regulation also seems to pose no serious constitutional problems, see Time Warner
Entm't Co. v. FCC, 56 F.3d 151, 186 n.13 (D.C. Cir. 1995), although it might be suspected that
similar regulation would be quite questionable as applied to newspapers.
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or even broadcasters for some types of messages.230 In any event, the
category of media as a whole is clearly too big. Concentration for
antitrust-type policy exists at least if there is concentration of those
engaged in either content creation or delivery.
The complaint, however, is much broader-and will become more
pointed when non-economic values are considered. Even for antitrust
purposes, consumers (and often more relevantly, advertisers) will often not
view different media as ready substitutes. Not only will many consumers
distinguish between the New York Times (NYI)' Metro Section and a
Disney movie, they will even distinguish it from the Los Angeles Times'
Metro Section. A price change in the Disney movie or the LA Times will
have little effect on their willingness to buy the NYT Many advertisers
will also distinguish these media products-a department store in Los
Angles is not likely to find the movie or the NYTto be plausible vehicles
for advertising its weekend sale. Whenever products are not substitutable,
and the provider of one cannot cheaply switch and supply the other,
concentration should be evaluated for antitrust purposes in relation to the
separate markets.
In sum, any suggestion that for antitrustpurposesthe relevant product
market is the media as a whole must be rejected. First, delivery and
content creation involve sufficiently separate activities that lack of market
share in one, and consequent lack of market power, says virtually nothing
about possible inappropriate market power in the other. Second, different
media products are often not economic substitutes for each other. The
more curious question would be why anyone might think so. I do not have
a clear answer, but Compaine is not alone. Earlier, I noted that the modem
FCC, but not the Justice Department, tended towards this view."
Progressive critics of media monopolies also tend not to make much of
these distinctions. 2 The most overt explanation would be that from a
completely commodified perspective, differences might seem
unimportant-but even at the level of commodities, that ignores the nature
of people's preferences. Much of Compaine's analysis suggests that he

230. Cf 47 U.S.C. § 312(a)(7) (2000) (requiring reasonable access for candidates' campaign
messages); id. § 315(a) & (b) (covering equal opportunities and lowest unit rate to be charged
candidates for broadcast time during election periods). The combination essentially amounts to
common carriage of candidate campaign advertisements. More dramatically, two Justices, Brennan
and Marshall, were prepared to see carriage requirements as constitutionally imposed on

broadcasters in relation to their advertising time, while other members of the Court indicated that,
though not required, Congress or the FCC might find it desirable to impose some such
requirements. CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 131, 170-204 (1973).
231. See supra text accompanying notes 89-92.
232. This may not be entirely true. Bagdikain, for example, identifies the firms that have at
least fifty percent of the market in various categories-such as book publishing, newspapers,
movies, broadcasting, etc. See BAGDIKAIN, supra note 9, at 22-24.
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basically adopts this narrow consumption viewpoint. 3 Alternatively, if
media content is merely the flypaper to capture readers who are then sold
to advertisers, all media content might appear to be competing in the same
market-but again, this ignores advertisers' more targeted interests in
different audiences. A third possibility is that the observer is not too
commodity oriented but, from an antitrust perspective, not commodity (or
consumer) oriented enough. The observer is much less concerned with
market power over price and much more concerned with concentrated
power over the public consciousness--or with the distribution of the
power to speak. This possibility leads, in a moment, to the next problem
with Compaine's analysis.
Note, however, that the rejection of the media as a whole as the
relevant antitrust category has not demonstrated where, or even if,
problematic concentration exists. These issues require much more
empirical examination, for which, in places, the data in Compaine's book
is relevant. Those inquiries are important, but here I want to turn to a
critique of Compaine's more important claim-that the antitrust approach
serves as a reasonable surrogate for advancing other important values.
b. Other Values
There is virtually no reason to think concentration that is acceptable
from the perspective of one set of values will be acceptable from the
perspective of others. Market power over price is only one possible
concern in identifying and objecting to concentration in the media realm.
Consider four other possibilities. First, the value of competition might
relate to the wish of a consumer or citizen to have diverse options in
relation to her particular interests, whether they be in local information or
in cultural options. The objective would be to prevent one or a few firms
from having power over content choice in the realm of her interest.
Second, the concern might be with effective opportunities for speakers to
reach significantly-sized targeted audiences with the expression the
speaker wishes to provide. The goal here may be to prevent a speaker from
being dependent on only one or two entities in her effort to reach a
significant portion of the elite-or the voters-in her town with a detailed,
complex, effectively presented account of corruption by the mayor or the
town's most powerful corporate business. Third, the concern might be
more with the citizens' wish that their community not be subject to
potential political or cultural manipulation by one or a few firms-a
democratic-related concern. Or, more broadly, not to have any enterprise
have too much influence over public opinion and public culture. Finally,

233. See CoMPAINE & GOMERY, supra note 189, passim.
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the concern with concentration might reflect a desire for a broad
distribution of opportunities for democratic discursive participation.
Each value produces a different conception of objectionable
concentration, none of which necessarily or predictably tracks the antitrust
standard of power over pricing. Only the first, a concern for audience
choice, even resembles antitrust concerns. Both focus on consumers'
commodity consumption, although the Chicago School antitrust approach
seems to limit the concern to the price variable and inefficient restrictions
on total output, while the first additional value extends it to a concern with
content choice. As discussed in Part II (and further below), power over
choice can exist without any firm having power over price. On the other
hand, concentration that gives power over price does not necessarily
undermine this value. Even if a few firms had sufficient market share that
they could exercise power over price, smaller alternatives could provide
for choice, especially for those consumers willing to search for these
alternatives. Alternative suppliers (for example, on the Internet), if
adequately financed to produce quality local news or cultural products,
could serve a consumer interest in availability of alternative content. Thus,
even concentration that leads to antitrust objections would not necessarily
be objectionable from this perspective.
In contrast, the other non-commodified values escape the antitrust
paradigm entirely. For the speaker interested in reaching local elites or
voters with her complicated expose, the relevant market might consist only
of the one widely read local newspaper or, alternatively, that, plus
prominent broadcasters who present serious local news. For the
democratic concern with potential manipulation of public opinion, the
relevant market might be similar-all significant participants in providing
serious local news. From these two viewpoints, even a market competitive
from the antitrust perspective could still look extraordinarily concentrated.
Even more so, lack of power over price does little to alleviate the concern
with an egalitarian sharing of opportunities to participate in public
discourse.
Still, the claim that concentration insufficient to create power over
price could be sufficient to create relevant power over content choices may
be counter intuitive to some antitrust analysts? 4 The (nalve) economic
view might be that, although non-price, as well as price, competition is
often possible, absence of power over one roughly indicates its absence
over the other. Of course, one firm might have a comparative advantage
(often based on some limited, legal monopoly) relating to some non-price
234. As used here, "power" refers to a capacity to move away from a prior (or imagined)

competitive equilibrium in a manner that does not undermine the entity's economic viability but,
instead, allows either increased profits or content conforming more to desires ofthe owner/producer
and, in each case, allowing the seller to act to the detriment of consumers.
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element, but as long as there is no undue concentrated pricing power, the
market should lead to a proper level of exploitation of this non-price
advantage. In contrast, by becoming a monopolist, an enterprise gains
power to increase profits either by increasing price or by reducing
expenditures on non-price aspects ofthe product-with some combination
of strategies generally optimal for purposes of profit maximization.
Obviously, power over either price or content depends on how a
change affects people's willingness to purchase. Other factors being equal,
an increase in price normally leads to some people not buying without
causing anyone new to buy.235 The situation is somewhat different for
content. While price changes are only quantitative, changed expenditures
on content can be either quantitative or qualitative. Thus, the change could
be in the total amount spent on content creation or the same expenditures
could be used to create somewhat different content-e.g., spend the same
amount, but on sports news or fiction or pro-republican commentary rather
than on local news. The second qualitative change is likely to lead some
people to whom the change appeals to become new purchasers at the same
time it causes some of the former audience to abandon the product. These
two groups could even be exactly equivalent. Since for competing
declining cost-goods, like most media products, there may be insufficient
demand to pay for both alternative products, the producer's choice could
determine availability. That is, an equilibrium position could develop with
either content prevailing. If so, a profit maximizing firm with no power
over price could have great power over content, being completely or
relatively unconstrained in respect to certain content changes-i.e.,
editorial slant, creative aesthetic, particular columns, etc.
Three hypotheticals can help illustrate how the different values a policy
maker could be concerned with lead to different characterizations of the
power generated by a merger. First, consider a newspaper chain, Firm X,
buying an additional newspaper in an area where it had no prior media
holdings. Part III-A argued that the nature of monopoly competition often
leaves the owner free to make choices about the product, possibly "paid
for" with monopoly profits. Those choices can involve either per copy
priceP 6 or content, but the purchase by Firm X does not increase these
powers, it only transfers them to the new owner. Thus, the purchase should
not create an antitrust problem. (Of course, if different sorts of owners
predictably exercise this power differently, this transfer may justify policy

235. I put aside occasional false signaling or status features of price-where, for example, the
higher price in itself increases the number willing to purchase the product.
236. See Blankenburg, supra note 199, at 390 and accompanying text. Blankenburg describes
this as the power, like other powers of censorship, to decide whether to deprive a portion of the
community (especially poor) of the communications that are vital to their democratic participation.
See id. at 398.
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concerns with ownership structure-but because of sociological
characteristics of owners, not because of concentrated powerperse.) Even
without monopoly profits sufficient to allow either the new or old owner
to make choices about price, if different content choices attracted and
drove away roughly equal numbers of readers (and even more so if
monopoly profits allow even more choice), a merger adds to the new
owners' power to determine generally what content is made available
within the country. Thus, although the merger does not create a concern
from either the antitrust focus on new anti-competitive power over price
or the broader antitrust concern with power over consumer choice, Finn
X's purchase creates concerns from the perspective of two of the
democratic values--concentrated power over public opinion and a wider
distribution of power to participate in the nation's public discourse.
Next consider a purchase of a second radio station by Firm Y in a ten
station market. Whether this creates the moderate concentration (using the
HHI index) that justifies antitrust scrutiny probably depends on both the
distribution of audience share among the various stations or, given that
radio's most overt product is listeners sold to advertisers, how elastic the
Antitrust Division believes the relation between radio advertising and
other advertising vehicles is. If, as seems likely, the merger does not create
power over pricing, no antitrust issue exists under conventional analyses.
On the other hand, in ways quite duplicative of the newspaper example,
power to change broadcast content should exist and, therefore, the
purchase should increase Firm Y's power over content choices available
to local radioaudiences.The merger would also increase the firm's power
over opportunities available to local speakers, or its power over public
opinion. Thus, the merger could have negative consequences-create
undesirable power-from the perspective of all four of the non-efficiency
values. Certainly, fewer media firms making content choices could justify
political or social concern-it certainly relates to major First Amendment
themes.
Finally, consider a local daily newspaper, Firm Z, purchasing the only
all-news radio station in a market with a dozen other radio stations.
Advertisers might find the value of listeners of the news radio sufficiently
similar to those of newspaper readers, but sufficiently distinct from other
radio listeners, that Firm Z will have increased its market power over rates
in an advertising market. This, however, seems unlikely. It certainly might
not be the case; and if it is not, finding monopoly power will be difficult.
On the other hand, the purchase quite obviously creates concentrated
power over local news. Of course, Firm Z presumably could not afford to
lose too many readers or listeners by making its content at its two outlets
too similar, too degraded, or too offensive to prior customers (without
picking up a sufficient number ofnew customers). Some content decisions
might even encourage the entrance of new competitors. Thus, the merged
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firm's power over content is not unlimited. Still, it surely has gained
considerable power over news choices available within the community. In
fact, an obvious reason for Firm Z to have bought a news radio station (or
a station that it will use to provide news) rather than a music station is
because of possible synergies (efficiencies) resulting from its capacity at
least sometimes to employ the same news inputs. In such a scenario, not
only will the firm's power over content have expanded to cover more
outlets and its dominance increased the barriers to the entry of new
providers, but also the choices made available to the public are likely to
have narrowed. That is, the merged firm will have no increase in power
over prices but considerably greater power over content. All the values
related to media power except the antitrust concern with anti-competitive
power over pricing will be negatively affected.
Thus, the initial complaint about the standard antitrust analysis has two
parts. First, a society can be legitimately concerned with concentrated
power over content choices made available to audiences. Second, this
power is frequently not well correlated with the focus on antitrust
attention-power over pricing. As was suggested above in Part III-A, this
lack of correlation depends in part on the nature of monopolistic
competition that commonly exists in respect to media products. 7 This
power over content but not price is exacerbated by advertisers being the
primary source of the media enterprise's income.
Two further normative points about this power over content have
policy relevance. First, in economic terms, this power describes a situation
where the market does not lead either the prior competing firms or the
merged firm to have an incentive to make choices that necessarily best
satisfy consumer desires (at least to the extent that the firms are unable to
price discriminate and are thus unable to obtain the consumer surplus that
their choices generate). And even if the incentive was present, the
competition does not dictate that the firm respond. Second, these market
failures merely exacerbate any democratic concern with the distribution
of uncontrolled power over information or public opinion created by the
merger.
3. The Internet Eliminates All Problems: The Claim
Compaine makes a dramatic claim to support his book's final
words--"[c]oncentrated media power is breaking up. 2 38 As he sees it, the

237. Perfect competition requires two features contrary to that which exist for media
products-the goods should be homogenous and be sold at a point on their supply curve where
marginal costs are increasing. For a discussion of conditions of perfect competition, see Averitt &
Lande, supra note 97, at 724-27.
238. CoMPAn E& GoMERY, supra note 189, at 579 (quoting Meyer, supra note 210).
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Internet changes everything. It erodes old bottlenecks, blurs the lines
between media, makes "conventional industry classifications decreasingly
relevant[,]" creates convergence, and lays the foundation for "diversity,
accessibility and affordability." 9 These purported developments are
offered to support Compaine's claim that a policy maker ought to examine
the converged media as a whole to determine if there is concentration.
When this is done, the analyst could reasonably agree that media power "is
no longer so concentrated."24 ° These developments also might appear to
justify his view that the problem may be "information overload and
fragmentation[, not] concentration and scarcity." 24'
4. The Internet: The Critique
This now ubiquitous invocation of the Internet is, in the end,
misleading.242 When Compaine says that "[t]he difference between the
Internet and newspapers, books, records or television is that [the Internet]
can be all [of] those things[,]" 2'43 he invokes a notion of convergence that
supports his inclusion of all media into one category. Clearly he is right
that policy analysis requires some rethinking of when there is
concentration. This point, however, is not so new. Technological change
always affects the relevance of particular concentrations. Before
television, the only way to see a movie was to attend a screening at a
movie theatre. A company that owned all the local theatres could
determine which movies people (in that area) could see. Today, a movie
may also be available on free over-the-air television, pay cable, satellite
video broadcasts, videotape rental, and, either now or soon, Internet
streaming. 2' Putting aside when the "format is the message"-such as
drive-in movies for teenagers-concentration within one traditional media
segment does not necessarily imply concentration in provision of
particular content.
Further consideration shows that, in itself, Compaine's observation
hardly provides a persuasive argument for lumping all media together or

239. Id at 541,575.
240. Id. at 579 (quoting Meyer, supra note 210).
241. Id. at 578. As noted, supranote 209, each term presents a separate issue. A possible view
is that both information overload andconcentration are problems, and that neither has much to do

with fragmentation or scarcity.
242. Like investors in the dot.com bubble of the late 1990s, other flee market advocates
invoke the Internet as eliminating all old problems. See, e.g., Eugene Volokh, CheapSpeech and
What It Will Do, 104 YALE L.J. 1805 (1995); Noam, supra note 208. They are right to see it as
bringing important changes, but most structural problems that previously were thought to justify
policy responses remain. BAKER, supra note 162, at 285-307.
243. CoMPAINE& GOMERY, supra note 189, at 575.
244. Cf discussion of ParamountPictures,supra text accompanying notes 81-85.
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for rejecting concentration as a problem. Part of the problem is the earlier
discussed distinction between content creation and content delivery.
Admittedly, digital technology significantly reduces the cost or difficulty
of making some media content. Largely, however, the Internet is a
distribution system. It enables new and cheaper distributional activities of
both pull (e.g., search engine) and push (e.g., spam) and more routine (e.g.,
online subscriptions, group emailing lists, individualized email) sorts. It
does not itself create content. Any media convergence generated by the
Internet is somewhat like that of ubiquitous super-stores-the WalMarts
where a customer can buy either a winter coat or a country ham. The store
itself creates neither; nor does the store make winter coats the equivalent
or a substitute for country hams. Even though the internet, like the store,
has made access to media products or communications much easier,
monopoly power could still exist over either any product sold at the store
or any type of content delivered over the Internet. Of course, a person
might sometimes trade-off reading an "online" report on peace
negotiations in the Middle East against watching an episode of the
Simpsons (now on TV, but surely soon to be "online"). But surely, the
better prediction is that, like the coat and ham at WalMart, these two
contents are not particularly competitive within most people's preference
functions. Many separate firms making sit-coins would not reduce the
concern with concentration if only one source provides quality wellresearched information about the Middle East (or about local government
or about corporate affairs). By itself, the Internet does not guarantee
plurality in either category. As someone who frequently checks both
Altemet and the BBC home page online, I must admit that diversity can
be added by reducing the importance of geographically limited
distribution. This hardly means, however, that it creates a convergence in
content categories or guarantees within a single category multiple quality
creators from whose competing content recipients can choose.
Of course, Internet distribution can affect the economic incentives for
product creation-but the nature of its impact is difficult to predict.
Abstract economics suggests simultaneous, opposing pressures. First, a
reduction in distribution costs, which is a major contribution of the
Internet, can increase the likelihood of concentration in the creation of
professional quality media content.245 When delivery and copy costs are
low, the incentive increases to use resources to make the most widely
appealing "first copy" because all the return from audience sales can be
used to pay for the cost of creation. These increased expenditures tend to
concentrate the audience on purchasing (or "spending" their time, which
is then sold to advertisers, on) these "better" products (whose purchase

245.

BAKER,

supra note 162, at 290-92 (discussing this point as well as a counter tendency).
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price need not go up). This effect tends to reduce the number of diverse
products available.246 In contrast, when delivery costs are higher,
increasing the audience for a particular product is less valuable (because
part of the audience's value is lost in paying for delivery). The resulting
incentive is to provide for the more intense but more varied needs or
interests of individual audience members.
This incentive for narrowing diversity is not, however, the only effect
of reduced delivery costs. Like with any lowering of costs of providing a
product and hence lowering of potential price, the reduced delivery costs
can increase the demand for the now less expensive media products.
Reduced costs also allow more people to try to become content
creators-that is, they lower barriers to entry. Most dramatically, this
change can enable a voluntary economy of non-commodified content
creators---greatly increasing diversity and content creation. Thus, on the
one hand, lower distribution costs can make new, more diversified product
offerings cheaper and, thus, more prominent. But, on the other hand, they
generate an incentive to make greater first copy expenditures that attract
larger audiences, thereby reducing the likelihood that small-audience
content creators will succeed commercially. This effect is to increase
concentration-what might be called the "Hollywood effect." The
dominance of these two opposing pressures can hardly be predicted
abstractly. Aspects of both are likely to be present to differing degrees in
different content domains.
So the Internet changes things. Does it eliminate the reason for concern
with media concentration and the need for responsive legal policymaking?
Consider, as five possible concerns about concentration, its effect on: (i)
the creation of diverse, quality content; (ii) the ability to reach a large and
desired audience; (iii) power over public opinion; (iv) a democratic
distribution of communicative power; and (v) availability of existing
diverse content to someone seeking it.
First, if a crucial matter in the communications order is enterprises' use
of resources to create quality content, the amount and way the Internet
changes things is unclear. As noted above, as primarily a distribution
system, the Internet in itself does not create content and, thus, does not
directly increase or decrease reasons for any concern with concentrated

246. In economic terms, any increase in expenditures on content creation (first copy costs) will
cause an increase in demand (if selling price remains constant). That increased expenditure can be
profitable at a lower increase of audience (demand) the less the increased sales go to pay for
distribution and copies (and, hence, the more of it is available for the expenditure on content).
Formally, if F = first copy costs, A = audience size, P = price, and V = distribution and copy costs
per audience member (variable costs), the condition for increasing expenditures on content is: F
S&A*P - AA*V, or AF &A(P-V), which shows that the amount F can increase is directly related
to a reduction of V.
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power over content creation. The economic changes brought by the
distribution may even give some reason to expect greater concentration or
a reduction of diversity of expensive-to-create content. Thus, issues of
concentration in various categories of content creation remain robustly
relevant.
Second, although it might seem that the internet makes it easier for
"speakers" to reach large and desired audiences, if the structure
encourages audiences' reliance on a few internet suppliers for most
content, this advantage may be illusory-leaving reason to be concerned
with concentration. Third, and similarly, even if the Internet reduces
distribution costs such that audiences are technically cheaper to reach, if
the economic changes result in a few "portals" becoming dominant, the
concern with concentrated, undemocratic concentration of power over
public opinion could increase. Fourth, despite its democratic potential, the
Internet, like the printing press, the mail, and the phone before it, does not
in itself democratize power to participate effectively in public debate. On
the other hand, as a cheaper and more flexible communication mechanism,
it can increase democratic (or more personal or commercial)
communications among those already organized or connected.
Fifth, because of the combination of easy and cheap "publishing" and
search capacities, the Internet may substantially alleviate the concern that
concentrated media will be a bottleneck that denies access to already
created communicative material that a person wants (and is willing to
make some effort to obtain). Of course, technological design choices such
as the form of search engines, imposition of filters by major service
providers, and similar matters-all potentially subject to leg&
regulation-could reduce this contribution. Nevertheless, foreclosure of
existing diverse content to persons seriously seeking it has long not been
a key issue for the communication order (at least in discursively free, nonauthoritarian societies). In the United States and most other industrialized
democratic states, the issues of greater concern have involved; first,
whether existing materials are provided in a manner that gives them
appropriate public or political salience-or is only the content controlled
by a few entities in fact socially and politically dominant. And, second,
there is the issue not of opportunities merely to talk or show home movies,
but of the availability and distribution of the resourcesneeded to research
and produce appealing, informative quality contributions to public
discourse. It is not obvious that the Internet itself eliminates reasons for
concerns about these matters. In some respects, it could even make the
problems more acute.
Thus, although the Internet certainly changes the competitive situation
in various ways, there is no reason to believe that it eliminates even
narrow antitrust concerns with concentration in various areas of content
creation.Potential power of control over major portals remains an area for
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policy concern. Most excitingly, there is some possibility that the Internet
will increase the number of "volunteer" (that is, non-profit oriented)
publishers. But most dangerously, it also could lead-as firms such as
AOL Time Warner or Disney presumably hope-to increased
concentration in the production of professional quality media and an
increase in the portion of the time that people spend on these concentrated
media.
C. Sociology ofProduction-Journalistically
DeterminedContent
Max Weber once suggested that, in the modem world, "the highest
ranking career official is more likely to get his way in the long run than his
nominal superior, the cabinet minister . .
247 He argued that because
bureaucratic administration was technically the most efficient means of
exercising authority, it was indispensable and inescapable.248 "Even in the
case of revolution..., the bureaucratic machinery will normally continue
' In a sense,
to function just as it has for the previous legal government."249
this argument downplays the power of the political leader. The "apparatus
makes 'revolution,' in the sense of the forceful creation of entirely new
formations of authority, more and more impossible... because of the
[apparatus'] increasingly rationalized inner structure.""25 The rationalized
daily activities of the huge number of officials organized in the
bureaucratic apparatus, not the wishes of those with formal power,
determine many aspects of life. Maybe a similar point could be made
about ownership's role in relation to the media.5
Media critics bemoan seeing only a world as portrayed by Murdoch.
Nevertheless, it could be argued that these media critics attribute to
Murdoch (and other media barons) a power that ownership simply does
not provide, a power that one person (or a small handful of people) could
not exercise. Daily news is produced by the collective action of many
journalists and editors who operate with set routines and behave largely
according to professional standards. An owner is simply not in a position

247. MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 224 (1968).
248. Id. at 223; see also idat 988.
249. Id. at 224.
250. Id at 989. As I have discussed elsewhere, Weber (as well as Marx) argued that the
structure of the market even more clearly determines behavior, making the specific identity and
wishes of the owner irrelevant. That, however, relates more to the somewhat different point made
in Part Ii-A,supra.I have also described circumstances underwhich Weber's conclusions may not
apply. BAKER, supra note 184, at ch.5.
251. I am not aware that the argument advanced in this part occurs in the scholarly literature,
possibly because of the reasons I reject it here. I present and reply to the argument because of

hearing versions of it in conversations with those educational progressive people who resist the
claim that concentrated (or corporate) media ownership is a major problem.
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to dictate the practice ofjournalism and it is this practice, not ownership,
that mostly determines the content of the news that people receive.
Parallel, even if slightly weaker, claims can be made about the assertedly
more creative world of entertainment content as well as about genres such
as magazine writing.
The sociology of content production received significant scholarly
development beginning in the 1970s by a group of scholars who showed
how the professional and institutional culture of news organizations,
journalistic work habits, and newsroom imperatives centrally affect how
the media construct the news.2 52 Although this work was not specially
aimed at making the point offered here-that ownership matters little-the
point here requires only a small step beyond these insightful
investigations. The conclusion would be that media content is determined
largely by the practices of the people who create it and that these practices
are only minimally subject to the directives of owners. Rather than being
controlled by owners, these practices are overwhelmingly determined by
some combination of professional education, on-the-job acculturation, and
institutional or organizational imperatives that themselves often reflect the
economic necessities of media production.
A critic of ownership concentration might point to various ad hoc
examples of owners effectively intervening. An owner might order an
editor to endorse the owner's choice for President or to avoid any
reporting, certainly any positive reporting, about a few individuals. This
type of intervention, however, is relatively rare, in part because editors
stand up for the professional norm that the owner not intrude on editorial
decisions." 3 But even if these intrusions sometimes occur, probably much
more significant are the paper's endorsements of minor candidates and
ballot issues about which the paper's readers are less likely to have
independent views. Some distant owner or CEO, some Murdoch, is
typically ignorant of these local races and issues. Intrusion hardly ever
does or could occur. Even more importantly, the real significance of a
paper's journalism lies much more in the day to day reporting that
highlights one or another set of issues that sets the public agenda or
252. See, e.g., EDWARD JAY EPSTEIN, NEWS FROM NOWHERE (1973); MARK FISHMAN,
MANUFACTURING THE NEWS (1980); HERBERT J. GANS, DECIDING WHAT'S NEWS: A STUDY OF
CBS EvENING NEWS, NBC NIGHTLY NEWS, NEWSWEEK AND TIME (1979); GAYE TUCKMAN,
MAKING NEWS: A STUDY IN THE CONSTRUCTION OF REALITY (1978).

253. Cf Pat Guy, More Newspapers Elect Not to Choose Candidates,USA TODAY, Oct. 26,
1992, at 6B (describing presidential endorsement as one where publishers or owners want to have
a say, but that involvement can produce "blood on the editorial board room floor," according to an
editor who threatened to resign when his former publisher at the Miami Herald ordered an
endorsement of Reagan); Howard Kurtz, The Pol and the Pendulum, WASH. POST, July 8, 2002,
at Cl (stating editor of the Pine Bluff Commercial resigned in protest when ordered by a local
owner to endorse a republican candidate for a House seat).
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establishes and reinforces one or another general frame of social thought
and public perception. These matters, however, inevitably reflect
professional and institutional cultures of the news professionals, not
directives of owners.
I will not try to survey this sociological literature here. It is not only
generally informative but also right to imply (assuming that it does) that
the influence of owners can easily be overstated. In a sense, this literature
delivers a message much like the adult's insight concerning the young
child's vision of an all powerful President running every aspect of the
country. The President's prominence, both in the press and in the child's
imagination, is overwhelming. However, in the face of Congress, an
entrenched civil service, decisions made before she assumes office, and
the necessity of delegation-not to mention stubborn facts about the real
world-her power to actually change what is done constructively (as
opposed to the power to initiate world destructive violence) is distinctly
limited. So it may be for media owners. They can close down a media
entity-but control over the communications it produces may be largely
beyond their power.
That is the possible claim. The basically correct observations, however,
only go so far. Despite the important adult (or scholarly) corrective about
Presidential power, the power is real. So too is that of a media owner (or
CEO or other top management). She may not have unbridled power over
the editorial product. However, owners or CEO's have substantial power
excisable and exercised in a variety of both subtle and unsubtle ways.
First, ownership or top management can make choices about profit
targets or expected rates of return. These choices often translate into
newsroom budgets and size ofjournalistic staff, factors that matter to the
nature of the media product. Even the decline in newspaper audiences over
the last quarter century may reflect in significant part media owners'
increasing their targeted rates of return.254 Publishers increase returns by
increasing per copy prices, intentionally cutting back circulation to
marginal portions of the audience least valued by advertisers, 55 or by
lowering editorial budgets that degrade the product.256 Next, although the
254. CRANBERGETAL., supranote 198, at 25, 90-97 (describing how shedding circulation to
those least valued by advertising has been a profit-based strategy, especially employed by publicly
owned chain newspaper firms).
255. In deciding not to advertise in the New York Post, a Bloomingdale executive reportedly
explained, "'[The Times] readers are our customers; your readers are our shoplifters."' MARTIN
MAYER, MAKING NEWS 84-85 (1993). Similarly, Otis Chandler once explained that he avoided
circulation among black readers-what Blankenburg describes as disenfranchisement-because
of their lack of value to the Los Angeles Times' advertisers. See Blankenburg, supra note 199, at
398; see also STEPHENBATES, IFNONEWS,SENDRUMORS 198-99(1989); BAGDIKIAN, supra note
9, at 116.
256. BAKER, supranote 7, at 67-69; Blankenburg, supra note 199.
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sociological studies are surely right about the major role of workplace and
professional routines, culture, and norms in determining the ultimate
content produced, owners either directly or through top management
whom owners do select can substantially affect the creation of the
workplace culture and notions of acceptable and unacceptable routines.
Third, owners can also vary dramatically in their orientation toward
expertise, ideology, or diversity among employees. These factors mean
that owners' choice of employees---or their choice of those employees
(e.g., top editors) who choose other employees-can have tremendous
consequences for the newsroom capabilities, culture, and biases that can
translate into the orientation of the content finally produced. Finally,
although direct interventions may be rare, their occasional occurrence can
queue the direction and stimulate the practice of employee self-censorship,
which journalists report to be a major determinant of content creation in
most corporately owned media.
Thus, sociological investigators are right to the extent that they
discover an important element of owner impotence. They are also right to
emphasize matters of routine, workplace culture, and professionalism as
major determinants of media content. It would be wrong, however, to
understand these insights as showing that owners do not have huge
amounts ofpower over content and over the construction ofmedia content,
power that is mostly exercised only indirectly.
IV. PROBLEMS POSED BY OWNERSHIP
The increasingly dominant Chicago School version of antitrust
identifies one potential problem with media or any other form of
concentration-creating power to raise prices above a competitive level
for the purpose of obtaining monopoly profits, with the result that the firm
restricts production below efficient levels.257 Part III showed that
ownership matters even when it does not raise this antitrust concern.
However, responsive legal policies require a more specific account of the
way ownership matters. In addition to possible antitrust violations, this
section identifies six problems, as well as one potential benefit, of
concentration.
A. Six Problems and a Doubyful Benefit
1. The Bottom Line
Part III-A showed that the nature of media markets leaves owners with
considerable decisionmaking discretion largely due to the availability of
257. See supra text accompanying notes 88-89. Cf. Stucke & Grunes, supra note 10.
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potential monopoly profits and that the exercise of this discretion can have
a significant impact on the media content "their" media provides."' Policy
should, if possible, aim to get ownership in the hands ofpeople most likely
focused on providing quality content-which almost irrespective of what
is meant by "quality," requires people less focused on the bottom line. 9
By being less focused on profits, these preferred owners may simply avoid
maximum exploitation of their monopoly product by keeping prices
comparatively low (although still above cost), with the result that people
will benefit by the products greater availability. Given that newspaper
reading is a major factor determining political participation260 (and, one
suspects, can also affect the quality ofparticipation), William Blankenburg
has argued that the decision over price is a major form of editorial policy,
and that the choice to maximize profits not only "suppresses information"
but even fails to treat the "expelled subscribers" as "citizens."26 '
More importantly, non-profit maximizing media owners could "spend"
their potential monopoly profits on content attributes that produce
significant benefits for the public even though the expenditures do not
produce revenue gains. These benefits could be characterized as positive
externalities produced by better journalism.262 When a paper or other

258. Putting quotes around "their" reflects the discussion in Part II-C of media workers being
the primary determinants of media content. In Miami HeraldPub. Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241,
258 (1974), the Court objected to a law "because of its intrusion into the function of editors."
(emphasis added). In AssociatedPressv. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945), relied on in Miami
Herald and even more so in Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969), the Court
emphasized that "the First Amendment does not sanction repression of [freedom of the press] by
private interests" nor does it "afford non-governmental combinations a refuge if they impose
restraints upon that constitutionally guaranteed freedom." Associated Press,326 U.S. at 20. If the
press is identified with editors andjournalists, the owners could be the "private interest"; the media
corporation could be the "non-governmental combination." It is not clear that the First Amendment
requires, although it presumably allows, identification of the press with the suppliers of capital (or
the "owners") as opposed to, say, the editors or other employees when the two conflict. Cf.
European notion of "internal press freedom," supra note 171.
259. This claim assumes that consumers and citizens are better served by the media devoting
efforts and resources toward widely providing quality content beyond the extent required for profitmaximization. For doubters, the arguments of both economic theory and democratic theory
supporting this assumption are surveyed in BAKER, supra note 162.
260. See, e.g., RUYA. TEIXEIRA, WHY AMERICANS DON'TVOTE 88 (1987).
261. Blankenburg, supra note 199, at398. Cf CRANBERGETAL.,supra note 198, at96, 149-50
(describing how the St. PetersburgTimes and New London Day, two papers owned by charitable
organizations, devote much more of their resources to journalism, generating better quality at less
price to the reader, thereby obtaining more circulation-for example, the St. PetersburgTimes, has
not only become the largest circulation paper in Florida, it has a 44% penetration rate in high black
areas as compared to more typical paper penetration rates in the teens).
262. BAKER, supra note 162, ch. 3. In traditional welfare economic terms, the claim is that
these "preferred" owners make "unprofitable" expenditures that produce significant positive
externalities, thereby moving closer to the "efficient" or consumer welfare maximizing content
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media entity is profitable but could be made more profitable by cutting the
newsroom budget, the public interest in quality media is served by having
owners (or editors) who would make the first choice. Society benefits by
owners' willingness to exercise "social responsibility" or otherwise
emphasizejournalistic or creative quality rather than merely maximize the
bottom line. Of course, legally mandating social responsibility is
inconsistent with a free press.263 However, the law properly considers the
impact of legal structural regulation of ownership on the likelihood of
producing or undermining more responsible ownership.
From a policy perspective, the question is whether it is possible to
identify legally specifiable categories of people or systems of ownership
control that are more likely to avoid a maniacal focus on the bottom line.2"
Attention must also be given to preventing restrictions on ownership being
manipulated for ideological purposes. 265 Although many more premises
are needed to support these conclusions, I suggest that some relevant
categories can be described. For example, owners living in the community
where the media product is distributed and owners closer to
journalistic/editorial process are generally likely to exercise more desirable
decisionmaking control and to be relatively more concerned with quality
and less single-mindedly focused on profit. Their identity is likely more
at stake in relation to the quality of the product, an effect reinforced by
being personally close to the consumers and professionally close to the
journalism critics who evaluate them primarily on the basis of content
quality and not merely the firm's economic success. Producing a quality
media product can further their standing in their community or their
profession. If these suspicions are correct, they support at least the
following policy preferences: disfavoring control by non-media
conglomerates-journalism executives have described their worst
nightmare as being controlled by corporate bosses who do not understand
expenditures.
263. Miami Herald,418 U.S. at 256.
264. The FCC already recognizes that these types of considerations might be relevant for
public policy when it directed public comments to address whether structural separation should be
mandated between two different, jointly-owned media entities both engaged in production of local
news. See In re Cross-Ownership of Broadcast Stations & Newspapers, MM Docket No. 01-235,
supra note 198.
265. Manipulation may be merely the epitaph applied to rules chosen to favor those whose
ideology one objects. Herman and Chomsky argue private capitalist ownership operates
ideologically under the conditions of the modem market to favor the views of the dominant power
groups in society. EDWARD S. HERMAN & NoAm CHOMSKY, MANUFACrURING CONSENT (1988).
The best hope to avoid objectionable manipulation is to make explicit normative defenses of the
preferences built into any rule structure. The identification of capitalist ownership with the First
Amendment is justified if the logic of the identification is adequately defended, but is simply
ideological if not required by available and appealing understandings of the First Amendment and
if alternative ownership structures can be shown to better serve democratic and audience values.
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the media;266 disfavoring ownership by media conglomerates or publicly
traded newspaper chains2 67 (especially when not necessary for the media
entity's existence268); favoring not only local ownership but also
ownership or at least control by the professionals who staff the media
entity. These considerations, for example, explain the FCC's past policy
of favoring both local ownership and integration of ownership and control
in comparative licensing decisions.269
2. An Undemocratic Distribution of Power
The "Berlusconi impropriety" could serve as the label for the
democratic concern with the distribution of communications power.
Once it is recognized that audience preferences do not completely control
media content, it should be clear that media influence over public opinion
and the democratic process will not be distributed in a democratic onecitizen/one-vote or even a one-consumer/one-dollar manner. Complete
equality of communicative power is probably not an appropriate goal.2 '
Still, a democracy should be concerned both that all groups have a real
share and that no one group or individual have too disproportionately large

266. See supranote 168.
267. The primary complaint of Cranberg et al. related to the changed structure and pressures
created by public ownership, although they also noted that large corporate ownership (even if not
public) might generate many of the problems they identify. CRANBERG ET AL., supra note 198, at
106. They do favor encouraging other forms of ownership-e.g., by charitable foundation. Id. at
148-52. Their primary recommendations, however, seem to accept that public corporate ownership
will continue to dominate, but suggest changes in compensation structure (i.e., not tied to profits
but to quality), different structures of board of directors, and related changes that could lead to less
focus on short term profitability and more to creating quality journalism. Id. at 142-46. Although
all these reforms seem well thought out, it is not clear why a public company would adopt them
voluntarily, and it is not clear whether the authors were proposing that the changes be legally
mandated or the form that such mandate would take.
268. This consideration could provide support for allowing existing entities to launch new
outlets or numbers but not to purchase (non-failing) existing media entities. See C. Edwin Baker,
Mergerphobia,THENATION 520-21 (Nov. 8, 1993).
269. Policy Statement on Comparative Broadcast Hearings, I F.C.C. 2d 393, 395 (1965). In
invalidating a use of such criteria, one problem identified by the Court of Appeals related not to the
wisdom of this type of control but the failure of the desired ownership being maintained "for an
appreciable period of time." Bechtel v. FCC, 10 F.3d 875, 879 (D.C. Cir. 1993). From the
perspective advanced here-the goal of producing quality journalism rather than maximizing
profits - the competitive bidding auction procedure that the FCC adopted in 1998, Competitive
Bidding Order, FCC 98-194 (rel. Aug. 18, 1998), to replace the comparative hearings (which
certainly had their own problems), has a perverse effect. It gives the license to the bidder who
predicts herself as being best able and willing to squeeze maximum profits from the license, a goal
that I argue above is directly contrary to the public interest in quality journalism or programming.
270. Silvio Berlusconi, assertedly the richest person in Italy, bought the three main private
television networks and then used them to twice get himself elected Prime Minister.
271. BAKER, supra note 184, at 37-46.
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a share of media power. This democratic concern goes a long way to
justifying the early FCC local and national limits on broadcast licenses,
which were inexplicable on the basis of a narrow antitrust analysis." z The
aim is explicitly to have a society in which the organs of public opinion
formation are maximally dispersed within the population. This perspective
makes largely irrelevant an antitrust search for evidence that the
concentration causes economic inefficiencies.273 Dispersal of media power,
like dispersal of voting power, is simply a key attribute of a system
considered to be democratic.
3. Democratic Safeguards
A dispersal of media ownership likely provides, and concentration
often undermines, two valuable safeguards to the well-being of a
democratic society. Dispersal can support performance of the "checking
function" or watchdog role. It is also likely to reduce the media's own
vulnerability to certain types of corruption. 74
Exposure of abuses of power and of failures of management provides
the basis for identifying the press as a so-called Fourth Estate, a role
emphasized by Justice Potter Stewart as justifying its constitutional
protection. 275 This watchdog function is a major benefit provided by the
media that is predictably under-produced even when ownership is
dispersed. Still, it is plausible to expect that a larger number of competing
"watchdogs," each of which competes to discover abuse, will better
perform this role than would only a few. A likely "synergy" of media
mergers is to reduce resources committed to investigativejournalism. Each
outlet of the merged firm can often sell the same investigative journalism,
the same exposes, thereby reducing the total amount the merged firmn
needs to spend on information gathering. In addition, a greater ownership
pluralism will likely increase the angles pursued by these media
watchdogs.
272. See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
273. As noted, as long as the FCC enforced ownership restrictions, they were so much tougher
than antitrust requirements that antitrust enforcement was irrelevant, a situation that has clearly
changed since the FCC eliminated or greatly relaxed most of its rules restricting ownership. See
supra note 86.

274. Both claims admittedly depend on empirical factors. Thus, the claims ideally need
empirical support and may not hold under some circumstances.
275. Although the attribution has been disputed, according to Thomas Carlyle, "[Edmund]
Burke said there were Three Estates in Parliament; but, in the Reporters' Gallery yonder, there sat

a Fourth Estate more important far than they all. It is not a figure of speech or witty saying; it is a
literal fact-very momentus [sic] to us in these times," quoted in Justice Potter Stewart, Or of the
Press, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 631,634 (1975). See generallyVince Blasi, The Checking Value in First
Amendment Theory, 3 AM. BAR FOUND. REs. J. 521 (1977); Justice William J. Brennan, Address,
32 RuTGERS L. REv. 173 (1979).
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Dispersal also creates a second safeguard. Those that most need to be
watched, those with political or economic power, often seek to control or
co-opt the media. Control or corruption is likely to be easier the fewer
media entities these co-opters need to control. A few can be purchased,
threatened, bribed, intimidated, or appealed to. Control of larger numbers
of influentialmedia is more difficult. 76 Safety is even greater if different
influential media entities have a variety of different financial bases and
organizational structures. A particular structure may be vulnerable to a
particular form of either intentional or market-based corruption."
However, that vulnerability often will not exist equally within portions of
the media differently structured, especially those with different financial
bases.
Even among media dependent on public funding, dispersal of editorial
control generates a degree of safety. Consider the advantages of public
broadcast stations each making its own policies and programming
decisions as compared to a centralized system. If public broadcasting as
a category has strong support in public opinion, a funding system in which
government budget reductions apply to all public broadcasters would be
a blunt, expensive, and easily opposed tool to use as a means to reign in
a single offending station. In contrast, even if technically possible,
politically a government decision to cut off only an individual offending
station for its critical expos6 would be too overtly censorious to have a
good chance of success. Such a move would generate both strong public
criticism and possibly an effective First Amendment legal challenge. In
economic or public choice language, the single crusading station will have
effectively externalized much of the political "cost" of its "offending"
action on the other public broadcasters. The larger group can use its
reservoir of collective public support to defeat the government's attempt
at retaliation.
276. Unfortunately for those who think the Internet has solved all the policy issues regarding
media and ownership, the caveat that the media be "influential" is important. Mere exposure of
dissident views on some theoretically accessible public media often accomplishes little, as earlier
but long ignored exposures of various abuses in the alternative press has often shown. There is a
sense in which the public reality to which people in power must respond exists only when stories
are reported and given adequate prominence by public media entities recognized by them and the
public to be significant. An important empirical issue needing more investigation for purposes of
understanding democratic practice involves the lines of communication and dispersion of stories
between media at different levels.
277. Given the common complaint that government supported media will not be effective
watchdogs, James Curran's observation that during Thatcher's reign, the government was subject
to "more sustained, critical scrutiny [by public broadcasters] than [by] the predominantly right-wing
national press." James Curran, Mass Media and Democracy Revisited, in MASS MEDIA AND
SocIETY 81, 88 (James Curran & Michael Gurevitch eds., 2d ed. 1996). His conclusion, from this
and other examples, was that "[s]tate-linked watchdogs can bark, while private watchdogs sleep."
Id. at 89.
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4. Media Vulnerability to External Pressures: or "Lean and Mean"
Well, maybe not mean, but independent. Conglomerate ownership can
make the entity and, hence, its editorial product more vulnerable to coopting or censorious outside pressure. When a media entity is part of a
conglomerate in multiple lines of business, either governmental or
powerful private groups may find themselves both able and willing to put
serious economic pressure on one portion of the conglomerate in order to
induce the media entity to mute critical reporting. Even pure media
conglomerates are subject to this vulnerability when an outside entity or
group, a government licensor or corporate advertiser, is able to impose
pressure on one element of the conglomerate. President Nixon, wanting to
retaliate against the Washington Post for breaking the Watergate story,
famously planned to create difficulties for the Post's broadcast licenses in
the license renewal process. 278 The greatest policy fear, of course, is that
the mere vulnerability will influence initial journalistic decisions-a form
of self-censorship---or prevent them from seeing the light of day. If
independent, book publishing should be relatively immune from advertiser
pressure. But advertisers apparently exercised power over Reader's
Digest, a magazine that like most is heavily dependent on advertising, to
get its book publishing subsidiary to cancel publication of a book critical
of the advertising industry.279 Similarly, Dupont's threat of withdrawal of
advertising apparently got Time, Inc., to get its associated Fortune book
club to drop the distribution of a book critical of Dupont.28 °
CBS, at the last minute, pulled a 60 Minutes show in which Jeffrey
Wigand, a former high level tobacco company employee, would report on
tobacco company executives' knowingly false congressional testimony.28 l
Commentators speculated that CBS's decision reflected its conglomerate
interests. 8 2 Lawrence Tisch, the major owner and head of Loews
Corporation, which then owned CBS, purportedly feared that broadcasting
the interview could provoke a lawsuit against CBS that would impede his
negotiations to sell CBS to Westinghouse. 283 More to the point here,

278. Hearings Pursuantto H.R. Res. 802 Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary,93rd
Cong., 2d Sess., bk. VIII, 321-23 (1974).
279. Pleasantville's Velvet Trap, PUBLISHER'S WKLY, June 17, 1968, at 49, discussed in
Bagdikian, supra note 9, at 163.
280. MARTIN A. LEE &NORMAN SOLOMON, UNRELIABLE SOURCES: A GUIDE TO DETECTiNG

BIAS INNEWS MEDIA 75 (1990); see also BAKER, supranote 7, at 46.
281. See Editorial, Second Thoughts at '60 Minutes,' ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, Nov. 28,
1995, at 180.
282. d; Neil WeinstockNetanel, Market Hierarchyand Copyrightin Our System ofFreedom
of Expression, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1879 (2000).
283. Walter Goodman, CoveringTobacco: A CautionaryTale, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 1996, at
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however, Wigand's expos6 was arguably contrary to Tisch's conglomerate
interests. 8 4 In addition to CBS, Loews owned Lorillard, a tobacco
company that was in the process of buying several tobacco brands from
Brown & Williamson, the company that the 60 Minutes broadcast would
expose. 8 5 Moreover, Tisch's son, who was President of Lorillard, would
be one of the people whom the 60 Minutes program would suggest had
committed perjury before Congress.8 6
In another case with a happier ending, drug companies apparently
threatened retaliation against the New York Times when the NYT began
publishing a series of stories concerning problems with prescription
medicines. 2 7 At first it might seem that the NYT would not be vulnerable
to pressure since the drug companies did not themselves advertise much
in the paper. 28 Nevertheless, the NYT owned several medical magazines
and the drug companies threatened to withdraw advertising in these
publications.28 9 In this case, legitimate journalism prevailed. The NYT
published-and it sold the medical magazines! 290 But the example
certainly illustrates the danger created by conglomerate ownership.
5. Internal Distortions
The flip side of conglomerate vulnerability to outside pressure is the
conglomerate owners' own incentives for distortion. Ownership by an
entity that has substantial non-media economic interests creates
opportunities and incentives to mold content to serve the firm's overall
corporate interests. Media ownership can be used as leverage over
outsiders, leverage whose value (and the potential for its journalistically
corrupt use) is increased to the extent the media owner has important
outside economic interests that can benefit. For example, during
Murdoch's campaign to get licenses for an airline he hoped to start, he
reportedly found291it profitable to promise Jimmy Carter the support of his
New York Post.

C16; Editorial, supra note 281.
284. See Goodman, supra note 283; Netanel, supra note 282, at 1923-24.
285. Netanel, supra note 284, at 1924.
286. See id.
287. Ben H. Bagdikian, NewspaperMergers, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV. 19-20 March/April
1997, discussed in BAGDIKIAN, supra note 9, at 162-63.
288. Id
289. Id
290. Id.
291. SCHIFFRIN, supra note 186, at 132. Other examples could be given. E.g., f id at 133
(describing decision not to publish a book by Chris Patten that was critical of China at the time

Murdock's media enterprises were seeking entry into China). Schiffrin asserts: "To Murdoch, the
use of publishing to achieve other ends was simply business as usual." Id. at 132.
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Simply as a media entity, strong professional demands, and some
economic incentives, encourage the media to maintain the integrity of its
content-incentives that lead to newspapers' self-portrayal of maintaining
a sturdy wall of separation between church and state, that is, between the
journalism and the business or advertising side of its operations. Of
course, this separation can and does break down. Still, the media entity
benefits to the extent that its audiences see its editorial decisions as
professional, not self-interested. The problem is that conglomerate
ownership inevitably increases the contrary incentives already produced
by advertisers. These potentially strong incentives will sometimes
outweigh the incentive for providing uncorrupted journalism. It will do so
even more if the corruption of content can avoid being too obvious, for
example, by becoming ingrained "self-censorship" or "business as usual"
such that no "smoking gun," possibly not even a conscious failure, can be
identified. Thus, unsurprisingly, overt molding of editorial content will be
observed only occasionally. Still, editors report routinely avoiding
investigations in areas where their reporting could be embarrassing to the
enterprise's outside interests-often having to do with land use,
convention or sports facility development or other local issues. Likewise,
content is sometimes consciously designed to be beneficial to the
conglomerate's overall political interests or to promotion of its other
(media or non-media) products. Even greater is the danger of unconscious,
routinized molding of content along lines of enterprise interests.
The point, of course, is not to demonize people like Murdoch nor
conglomerates like General Electric or Loews. Rather, the point is to see
how conglomerate ownership creates both the economic vulnerability to
outside pressure to corrupt the journalistic enterprise and the internal
incentives to trade journalistic integrity for other conglomerate economic
interests. Desirable responses can take two forms: resistance or (partial)
structural removal of the incentives for distortion. Both systematic
enterprise and heroic individual resistance occurs. Strengthened
professional norms impede these forms of distortion. Still, one wonders
why society should tolerate structures that unnecessarily sacrifice careers
of courageous journalists to this economic logic? When does the need for
structural change become obvious? The most direct response is to
eliminate (or at least reduce) the structural incentives for corruption by
avoiding the form of ownership that generates them. Ownership by nonmedia corporations could be prohibited and media conglomerates could be
disfavored.
6. Inefficient Synergies
Corporate management justify media mergers to their stockholders
(and governmental regulators) with loud claims about profitable and
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efficiency-serving "synergies." As it turns out, many media enterprises
during the 1990s and since have apparently found profitable synergies
difficult to realize. Still, sometimes some cost savings or interactive
benefits undoubtedly exist. The merged entertainment company may
benefit by selling the same highly promoted fictional character or story in
new mediums-in a theatre-released movie, a television show, a book, a
magazine excerpt, a CD based on the movie sound track, and, especially
in relation to children-oriented media, as subsidiary branded products or
computer games characters. By clever placements, the enterprise can also
cross-promote its various products. Its broadcast news division or its
popular magazine can do stories about its movie studio's release of the
"outstanding" new movie or television series. They can also offer in depth
reports about the program's star character, about its Oscar or Academy
Award potential, or other related matters of equally "great public
concern." Similarly, after the merger, the local broadcast station and
newspaper can share reporters, reducing outlays on local affairs reporting,
or at least requiring reportorial cooperation, eliminating the wasted
expense of doing the reporting twice from scratch.
"Profitable," however, does not mean in the "public interest." Often
these "synergies" or efficiency "gains" occur by creating marketdominating media goods. Although profitable for the firm, these may
provide less value to the public (even as measured by the economic
criterion of "willingness and ability to pay in a market") than would the
media goods they drive out of existence. In other cases, these synergies
reflect cost saving from reducing expenditures that previously provided
significant positive externalities.
Consider the first point. Market success means that an audience (or the
advertisers) value a product in excess of its immediate cost. Thus, the
merged firms' new (or newly expanded) synergistic products undoubtedly
provide value to society.292 Nevertheless, monopolistic competition among
media goods can result in the competitive success of products that cause
the failure of competing media products that still would produce more
"consumer surplus" than do the prevailing goods.293 This can occur when
the new "synergistic" product provokes a slight downward shift in the
demand for the alternative media products, causing some to fail even
though they would still generate more value for potential customers than
they cost to produce.294 This potential excess value becomes lost consumer

292. That is, "undoubtedly" unless the content produces bad consequences not taken into
account by purchasers-negative externalities of some sort, for instance, increased levels of societal
violence.
293. BAKER, supra note 7, at 44-71.
294. Of course, this problem would not exist if it were not for media goods being unlike goods
hypothesized in standard models of pure competition. Media goods' low copy costs mean they are
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surplus. Of course, the lost consumer surplus can be either mor8 or less
than the surplus generated by the new competing product.295 A net loss is
most likely to occur when the prevailing (synergist) product's demand
curve is flatter than that of the media products that it competitively
eliminates-a criterion generally suggesting the prevailing product has a
larger audience. Or it can occur when the firm providing the prevailing
product needs and is better able to price discriminate, for example, by
selling the product in multiple "windows," a possibility often supported by
the merger. These two scenarios describe contexts where the dominating
product produces comparatively little consumer surplus, with the net result
that though the synergistic product produces some value for society, it
produces a net loss due to the lost surplus of the products it displaces. The
problem with mergers is that often their profitability is :predicated
piecisely on the hope of increasing opportunities for effective price
discrimination or for creating "blockbuster," best selling products. These
enterprise hopes should translate into public interest worries. The danger
is that these synergies will damage consumer welfare by eliminating more
valued media alternatives.
The second welfare loss has also already been discussed using different
conceptual foci. It occurs when synergies transform characteristics of the
media entity or eliminate (duplicative) practices that have significant
positive externalities. Thus, the earlier discussion of investigative
journalism as a democratic safeguard observed that the benefits due to the
media's exposure or deterrence of official or corporate malfeasance go
equally to people other than the paper's readers or purchasers. The result
is inadequate (monetary) incentives, leading to the prediction that the
market will under-supply this type of journalism. As noted, mergers can
exacerbate this under-production if, for example, one "synergy" of
merging a newspaper and a local television station is that they can now get
by with the amount of (or less) investigative journalism previously done
by only one of the tWo. 2 9 6 "Synergy" from the perspective of the merging
firms is net social welfare loss from the perspective ofthe individuals who
make up society.

normally sold at a price above marginal cost and where the marginal cost is less than average cost.
The problem also would not exist if the seller/producer could adequately price discriminate so as
to internalize more of the media product value.
295. Formally, if synergistic Producer A produces a surplus (producer plus consumer) of a,
and puts out of business Producers B, C, and D, which at the point where they fail are still
producing consumer surplus of b, c, and d, the social welfare question is whether a > b + c + d or

whether a < b + c + d. Neither Producer A's market success nor abstract theory gives reason to
predict one or the other outcome, although the discussion in the text above tries to describe
situations where the second alternative is more likely.
296. See supra text accompanying notes 275.
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This example shows that an apparently profitable and efficient merger
from the perspective of the firm can be costly for society even though it
does not create a power over prices troubling to antitrust regulators. The
profit maximization perspective that normally guides the firm and the
social welfare perspective that should guide policy diverge. In the first
discussion above, the welfare loss reflects the consequences of
monopolistic competition between new synergistically produced goods
and other media goods. The second sees welfare losses due to synergies
that reduce expenditures on activities that produce significant positive
externalities.
7. Public Benefits of Concentrated Media?
Any policy analysis must also consider possible benefits of media
concentration. Merger proponents often argue that mergers can benefit the
public both as consumers and as citizens. These empirical claims cannot
be dismissed (or empirically assessed) here. Still, some comments about
reasons for doubt and some comments about the stronger claims are
appropriate.
Merger proponents often suggest great consumer benefits. My
impressionist observation is that the subsequent experience with the
conglomerate mega-mergers of the 1990s more often shows mergers to
have been disappointments even from the corporate (or, at least, the
stockholder) point of view. "97 If so, an observer might wonder if ego
aggrandizement or personal financial interests of corporate leadership, not
consumer benefits or even corporate economic benefits, has been the
major driving force behind media mergers. But suppose that the merger
does make real economic sense for the corporate entities involved. What
does that imply?
The central problem with the assertion that mergers produce social
benefits is knowing where to find evidence. As a rule of thumb,
profitability relates directly to efficiency at producing (or distributing)
goods or services valued by the public. Therefore, increased profitability
is often taken as evidence that there is a benefit to society. But the last six
topics of this section show that this relation can be dead wrong in the
media context. Media mergers can disserve consumer welfare even if the
merger does not create antitrust violations and does create profitable
297. As I write this, Robert Pittman, COO of AOL Time Warner and possibly the major
pitchman for the synergistic advantages of the merger two years before of the two companies,
resigned under pressure. Amy Harmon, Shake-up atAOL: The FormerExecutive, N.Y. TIMES, July
19, 2002, at Cl. Although the general burst of the dot.com bubble may merit a substantial part of
the blame, the company stock had lost 80% of its value since the merger, leading some to question
the merits of the synergy theory. Id; David D. Kirkpatrick, Man in Middle ofAOL DealIs Now in
Center ofa Storm, N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 2002, at Al.
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efficiencies for the merged firm. Do they in any particular case? The
potential divergence between the corporate and societal perspective
highlights the evidentiary difficulty. It also suggests that claims by
potential merger participants may reflect narrow self-interest connected at
best to greater profitability but with no necessary connection to any public
benefit. The empirical burden requires the advocate of mergers to rely on
arguments other than reference to market data. This empirical problem is
intensified by the difficulty of determining and weighing any purported
benefits. These will all involve contestable evaluations.298 Here, I merely
assert that consequences for the media's democratic and cultural roles are
the most important and ought to dominate policy making absent strong
evidence of extraordinary consumer benefits.
Independent commentators most commonly claim on behalf of larger
corporate entities that these entities will be better able than smaller
independent media entities to stand up to outside pressures or will be able
to finance expensive investigative reporting. Of course, this empirical
claim is difficult to assess. Eric Sevareid, one of our most prominent
television news commentators of the last generation, may have gotten it
right when he said: "the bigger the information media, the less courage
and freedom of expression they allow. Bigness means weakness ....
Courage in the 299
realm of ideas goes in inverse ratio to the size of the
establishment.
Some explanations of Sevareid's claims are plausible. The likelihood
of a media entity's standing up to economic and other pressures may have
less to do with financial resources and much more to do with ajournalistic
decisionmaker's courage and commitment to the integrity of their
journalism. Even ifthis type of courage and commitment were distributed
equally among heads of small and large media news entities, its presence
would be more common if there were simply more heads-that is, if there

298. In a luncheon seminar attended by the author at the Joan Shorenstein Center at Harvard
University during the 1992 academic year, Nich Nicholas, Jr., former head of Time, Inc., and then
co-CEO of Time-Warner until being fired in early 1991, defended the merits of the merger, see
RICHARD M. CLURMAN, TOTHEENDOFTIME 348-356 (Touchstone ed., 1993). Central among his
claims of how the merger benefitted the public was that without the merger, most of the public
would not have the 500 cable channels that they would now have by 1995. Although I (and most
people) still do not have 500 channels, I wondered at the time why I would want them-would not
a few channels of quality programming suffice?
299. McDonald, The Media's Conflict of Interests, CENTER MAG. 15, 24 (1976), quoted in
BAKER, supranote 7, at 267. Relying on their own experience as owner/editors of a small family
owned Kentucky newspaper, Pat and Tom Gish used dramatic examples to forcefully illustrate their
claim-the possibility of a paper such as his doing effective advocacy and exposd journalism
depended on not being owned by a newspaper chain. See Pat Gish & Tom Gish, We Still Scream:
The Perilsand PleasuresofRunning a Small-Town Newspaper, in THE BUSINESS OF JOURNALISM
3-25 (William Serrin ed., 2000).
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is less media concentration. 300 Moreover, sociological and psychological
factors suggest the distribution will not be random. Courageous,
committed journalists may be more likely to lead small journalistic
enterprises than to have risen to the top in media conglomerates. These
independent editors and owners may identify more with the journalistic
endeavor than with their own institutional advancement. On the other
hand, risky exposes or innovative experiments may threaten institutional
security or advancement, a factor that may increasingly motivate
employees of larger corporate entities whose position gives them more to
loose.311 Ifexposrs (ofcreativity-think "independent film") cut too much
against the grain and do not produce any obvious financial benefits, their
development or publication may be least likely to receive support within
corporatized media entities that have the least internalized professional
commitments to journalism or creativity.
If these speculative empirical hypotheses are right, they provide
additional reasons to disfavor media concentration. Interestingly, they
could also have implications for the appropriate design of public media
institutions. They might support, for example, dispersing and
decentralizing editorial authority in public broadcasting rather than
creating a unified system with authority located at the center.
B. Ownership to Serve a Democracy:Diversity of Ownership
Section A identified objections to ownership concentration beyond any
antitrust problem such as anti-competitive power over pricing. There
remains the question of the implications for concentration policy of an
affirmative vision of the role of the media in a democratic society. I now
turn briefly to that issue. 2
No democratic theory condones government censorship. It is also
widely thought that much censorship ofjournalism or creativity by private
power is similarly objectionable. All democratic theories assert that the
media should perform a "checking" or "watchdog" or "fourth estate"
300. The claim is that if percentagesare the same, a higher number of owners deciding in
favor of exposes will increase the number of meaningful exposds. This would not follow if the

smaller number of committed, courageous leaders within the concentrated context could assure that
each of their subunits choose a strong investigative stance. Thus, my claim implicitly assumes that
cautious conglomerate heads will be more effective at inducing avoidance among subordinates
(e.g., editors of entities owned by the conglomerate) than their courageous counterparts will be at

the opposite. Another way to put this is that the "safer" response will be more likely given
increasing potential decisionmakers there are that must sign off on "risky" decisions that could be
damaging to the entity-that is, caution is the more likely default rule.
301. CRANBERG ET AL., supra note 198, at 104 (suggesting public ownership of papers
encouraged more risk aversion as well as more overwhelming focus on financial performance).
302. This part is based on BAKER, supranote 162, part II, revisedfrom C. Edwin Baker, The
Media that CitizensNeed, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 317 (1998).
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function. 3 Any ownership structure that impedes this performance should
be presumptively condemned. Beyond these points, different visions of
democracy offer differing affirmative visions of how media can serve a
democratic society.
In what I label "complex democracy" 3 4 -a concept quite close to
Habermas's "discourse theory of democracy" 305 -the media have the
following central functions in addition to its watchdog role. First, the
media should be an instrument of a society-wide public sphere that
addresses common problems, values, and solutions-and allows all groups
to participate in a society-wide discussion of the "common good." Second,
the media should provide a means for identity of interest groups to
determine when their own concerns are at stake and to mobilize for
political participation in a pluralist, society-wide bargaining process.
Finally, groups do not come into existence with unchanging interests on
their sleeves. The media must provide societal subgroups, especially
"subaltern" or marginalized and oppressed groups, 30 6 a realm for their own
exploration and identification of their own common good and selfdefinition.
Looking solely at the first of these three functions, as do some
"republican" or "deliberative" democratic theorists, the central problem is
not concentration but the media's "social responsibility." Monopoly or
conglomerate media enterprises, as long as they do not deny access to any
groups and as long as they produce good and inclusive journalism aimed
at finding, promoting, and elaborating the common good, perfectly fit
society's democratic needs of supporting a society-wide public sphere.0 7
Too much dispersal of ownership may even threaten a social
fragmentation that would frustrate a common discourse about the common
good.30 8
This complacent view of concentration must be rejected by complex
democrats once they add the latter two functions to the tasks required of
a democratic media. To perform these, different societal subgroups need
their own media. Admittedly, these subgroups (or their members) do not
necessarilyneed to own their own independent media. Avenues of regular
303. See Baker, supra note 302, at 324-25.
304. BAKER, supra note 162, at 143-47.
305. JURGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DISCOURSE
THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY

(William Rehg trans., MIT Press 1996); Jtlrgen Habermas,

Three Normative Models of Democracy, in 1 CONSTELLATIONS 1 (1994).
306. Nancy Fraser, Rethinking the PublicSphere: A Contributionto the CritiqueofActually
ExistingDemocracy, in HABERMASANDTHEPUBLIC SPHERE 109, 137 (Craig J.Calhoun ed., 1992).
307. Despite not necessarily favoring deconcentration regulation, this approach is not antiregulatory. For example, it may find access rules--or fairness doctrine type requirements-very
beneficial.
308. See CASS SUNSTEIN, REPUBLiC.COM 72-75 (2001).
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and effective media access might suffice. Still, a wide distribution of
ownership or control wouldjustify much greater confidence that the media
will serve these groups' democratic needs. More specifically, complex
democracy has two primary implications for media ownership. First, in
addition to society-wide media organized or owned in a way most likely
to lead them to be dedicated to social responsibility, ownership of much
of the media should be widely dispersed. Second, the democratic need is
not simply for many competing, separately owned media enterprises, in
other words, for lack of concentration. Democracy also requires that the
ownership or control be widely dispersed among the various segments of
society. When this occurs, the resulting source diversity is valuable
independent of whether it produces content diversity-although it seems
predictable that it will produce some particular sorts of diversity in
content.
Of course, under existing conditions, any likely market system is likely
to provide some media serving each of these multiple democratic
functions. The real policy issue is whether the market will inadequately
nourish some democratic functions and the media corresponding to them.
Or, for present purposes, the issue is whether existing ownership
concentration creates a democratic imbalance. Reasons to suspect that this
is the case have been canvassed above.
V. CONCLUSION: IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY

Although not detailed enough to suggest an ideal media ownership
policy, the present discussion supports a number of conclusions. First,
general antitrust enforcement should continue vigorously. Moreover,
whether or not in other areas of the economy antitrust law should be
largely restrictedto economic efficiency concerns and monopolistic power
over pricing, it should not be so limited in the media arena.
Second, at least two considerations support subjecting media
ownership to additional regulation. Pragmatically, the advantage of dual
legal regime and dual agency enforcement is that lack of political will
within one agency or narrow judicial interpretation of laws enforced by
one agency will be less damaging. More fundamentally and conceptually,
media specific concerns reflecting both features of media economics and
special democratic roles of the media require media specific polices.
Antitrust laws, even on their broadest interpretation, simply do not respond
to all the media specific reasons to limit concentration. An expansive
antitrust law interpretation may be sensitive to a merged entity's power to
narrow consumer's content choice even when the merger did not lead to
any power over pricing." 9 However, antitrust law's focus on consumers
309. See, e.g., Averitt & Lande, supra note 97, at 752-53. See also Stucke & Grunes, supra
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is unlikely to embody the democratic concerns with assuring maximum
numbers of separate owners participating in the "marketplace of ideas" or
with democratic worries about concentrated power to influence public
opinion. For these purposes, the FCC's now largely abandoned rules
strictly limiting national ownership of different broadcast entities made
great sense. Similar points apply to the earlier FCC policy preferences for
local ownership and for an integration of ownership and management or
control. Even though not always effective-for example, subsequent
license transfers regularly defeated the goal of using these preferences in
comparative licensing proceedings-these policies served important
media-specific values that are not so easily assimilated into antitrust
policy. Thus, the discussion here supports generally more stringent,
somewhat differently focused, media-specific rules relating to ownership,
probably combined with a second enforcement agency (such as the FCC).
Ideal policies cannot be spelled out in the abstract. At best, the
affirmative vision of the media's democratic role can help guide policies
that respond to particular contextual and variable conditions. Nevertheless,
the argument here suggests the wisdom of James Curran's
recommendation that legal policy support a variety of organization and
structural forms.310 Specifically, Curran envisions five media sectors, each
organized on a somewhat different structural and financial basis, each with
its own set of goals or functions, and each responsive to somewhat
" ' This plurality may provide security in that neither
different incentives.31
government nor market corruption of the media is likely to be equally
powerful within or equally damaging to all the organizational forms. Thus,
this plurality of media structures supports the media's checking function.
Moreover, this diversity is likely to enable the media to better perform its
multiple democratic assignments.
Curran's proposal relates to a final point about media ownership. The
concerns with ownership relate, in the end, to whom has control over
media content and how these people will use this power. That is, an ideal
policy will be concerned with more issues than mere ownership
concentration. Rules structuring control of decisionmaking within media
entities respond to the same value-based concerns. Which groups ofpeople
or which individuals, with relations to various wider societal groups,

note 10.
310. James Curran, Rethinking Media and Democracy, in MASS MEDIA AND SOCIETY 120,
140-48 (James Curran & Michael Gurevitch eds., 3d ed., 2000).
311. His five sectors are: core sector (his model here is a social responsibility oriented public
broadcast system such as the BBC), civic media sector (performing many of the pluralistic
democratic functions described above), professional sector (controlled by media professionals and
serving ideals internal to their profession), private enterprise sector, and a social market sector
(compensating for inadequacies of the market and developing new forms of competition). Id.
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should exercise control is also important-as implicitly recognized by the
former FCC policy favoring racial diversity in ownership. The general
democratic goal is increased pluralism of sources and viewpoint as well
as of content or subject categories.
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